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Abstract 
 
Methods of performing and defending against deceptive actions are a popular 
field of study in game theory.  However, the focus is mostly on action deception in turn-
based games.  This work focuses on developing strategies for performing environmental 
deception in two-player, strategic-form games.  Environmental deception is defined as 
deception where one player has the ability to change the other’s perception of the state of 
the game through modification of their perception of the game’s payoff matrix, similar to 
the use of camouflage.  The main contributions of this research are an expansion of the 
definition of the stability of a Nash equilibrium to include cells outside the equilibrium, 
and the creation of four algorithms for developing strategies for environmental deception, 
including closed-form solutions for the creation of a 3x3 deceptive game with a 2x2 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) that benefits the deceiver from a 3x3 game 
containing a 2x2 MSNE.  It is found that the value gain produced by a deceptive algo-
rithm is dependent upon the type of game to which it is applied and the maximum amount 
of allowable change to the payoff matrix, emphasizing the importance of carefully select-
ing an algorithm to match the situation to which it is applied.   
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GENERATION OF STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DECEPTION IN 
TWO-PLAYER NORMAL-FORM GAMES 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Deception in game theory is an area that has been widely studied in the fields of 
economics, military decision making, and security.  The ability of one player in a com-
petitive game to deceive his opponent(s) provides him with the ability to achieve an out-
come more favorable to him than if the potential for deception does not exist.  This op-
portunity for increased advantage has motivated the study of deception in game theory in 
many different forms. 
Game theory provides a means to generate models of situations and determine the 
best available action to take.  In game theory, games are dichotomized in multiple differ-
ent ways based upon the purpose, structure, and solution of the game.  This provides a 
means to succinctly describe the key features of a situation based upon which class it falls 
into for each of the dichotomies. 
One of the characteristics of games in game theory is if it is cooperative or com-
petitive.  In a cooperative game, the players are able to form coalitions where agreements 
are enforceable by some means and the result of the game is based upon the coalitions 
that are formed [1].  Such games are structured so that the incentives for cooperation are 
built into the payoff matrix of the game.  In a competitive or non-cooperative game, the 
players are not able to form such coalitions or the coalitions are not enforceable [2]. The 
games studied in this research are competitive games where a gain on the part of one 
player represents a loss by their opponent. 
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Another dichotomy of games in game theory is the game structure.  Two possible 
structures exist: strategic-form games and extensive-form games.  In strategic-form, also 
known as normal-form, games, all players simultaneously select an action and the result 
of the game is the result of the combination of actions.  A strategic-form game can be 
represented as an n-dimensional matrix where each dimension corresponds to the actions 
of one of the n players and a cell of the matrix contains the payoff matrix for all players if 
the combination of actions that intersects in that cell is played.  An example of a strate-
gic-form game is rock-paper-scissors, where players select one of three possible moves 
simultaneously and the result of the game is determined by the combination of moves 
played.  Extensive-form games are turn-based games where the players alternate moves 
until an end state is reached.  An extensive-form game can be represented by a tree where 
each node is a state of the game and each child node is the result of the current player 
taking one of the actions available to her.  An example of an extensive-form game is 
chess, where players alternate moves until a checkmate or draw occurs.  The games stud-
ied in this work are strategic-form games. 
Finally, games are distinguished based upon the type of solution that they contain.  
In 1951, John Nash published the concept of the Nash equilibrium which states that every 
game contains an equilibrium strategy profile for each player where each player’s strate-
gy profile is a best response to the others’ and no-one has incentive to deviate from their 
equilibrium strategy profile [2].  The term strategy profile is used here to describe a set of 
actions to take with a given probability of play for each action.  A strategy that is a best 
response to another strategy provides the highest possible payoff given that the opponent 
is playing the other strategy [2]. 
3 
Nash defined two types of equilibria: pure-strategy Nash equilibria and mixed-
strategy Nash equilibria.  In a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE), all players have a 
single strategy that they will play 100% of the time.  Deviation from this strategy will 
provide a lower payoff to a player if their opponents do not change their strategy as well.  
In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), all players have a set of strategies that 
they randomize over so that their opponents do not know which strategy that they will 
select.  Each strategy has a set probability of selection intended to make the opponents 
indifferent between the strategies in their equilibrium strategy set, i.e. each strategy has 
the same expected value.  Games containing both pure-strategy and mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibria are considered in this research; however, the equilibrium type can affect the 
strategy used so it is useful to note. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The particular class of game studied in this research is a two-player strategic-form 
competitive game in which each cell of the payoff matrix a payoff value for each player 
than are constrained to the range [0,1] and sum to one.  These values represent the re-
maining percent of full functionality of the deceiver’s systems after the actions chosen by 
the deceiver and mark are executed and the percent by which the attacker has degraded 
the deceiver’s functionality.  The games studied will contain three actions for each player 
and are represented such that the row player or evader attempts to maximize remaining 
functionality while the column player or pursuer attempts to maximize the degradation of 
the deceiver’s functionality.  
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For the purpose of this research, the evader or deceiver is given the ability to take 
deceptive action against the pursuer or mark.  The evader has full knowledge of the com-
plete state of the payoff matrix and the ability to change the values of the payoff matrix 
as perceived by the pursuer before play begins and each player selects his strategy.  This 
ability is constrained by the resources available to the evader, represented by a maximum 
amount by which the payoff values can be changed.  The goal of this research is to de-
termine strategies where, given a game, the evader can maximize the amount of benefit 
received from using deception with the limited resources provided to him.  This form of 
deception is referred to as environmental deception as the deceiver changes the mark’s 
perception regarding the state of the world rather than his perception of the deceiver’s 
choice of actions, as is studied in action deception.  It is important to note that environ-
mental deception changes only the attacker’s perception of the world, not the actual state 
of the world.  All benefit gained by the evader through deception is gained by causing the 
pursuer to play using a strategy different than the strategy he would play if presented the 
true payoff matrix.  This change in the pursuer’s strategy occurs because the pursuer’s 
perception of the game being played differs, causing him to select a different strategy of 
play in order to achieve a high payoff for himself.  The evader can design the deceptive 
game to increase the probability that the pursuer will select a strategy that increases the 
payoff to the evader in the true game. 
An example of the type of situation modeled by the games and use of deception in 
this research is the use of flares and chaff by planes in dogfighting.  The goal of the use 
of flares and chaff is to deceive the enemy missiles into believing the state of the world, 
i.e. the location of the target plane, is different than the truth.  Chaff can deceive radar by 
5 
appearing as another metallic object near to the target aircraft, while flares have a heat 
signature that can cause infrared sensors to target them rather than the plane being target-
ed.  The intelligent use of flares or chaff increases the remaining functionality of the 
evader’s plane after the missile has exploded while the wrong choice provides little or no 
benefit.  Further, an evader’s deceptive strategies are constrained by the resources availa-
ble to him as a plane can only carry a finite amount of flares and chaff which, once ex-
hausted, provides no benefit to the evader.  An optimal deceptive strategy makes the best 
use of the available resources to increase the evader’s functionality after an attack. 
The determination of strategies for environmental deception is simplified by the 
existence of isomorphic transformations of games.  Isomorphic transformations refer to 
reordering of the rows and/or columns of the payoff matrix.  A game that is an isomor-
phic transformation of another game is equivalent to the other game given relabeling of 
the rows and columns.  This means that a deceptive strategy developed for one game can 
also be applied to all games that are isomorphic transformations of the game if the appro-
priate transformation is applied to the deceptive strategy.  This greatly decreases the 
search space for effective strategies and makes possible the development of deceptive 
strategies that depend upon a certain ordering of the rows and columns of the payoff ma-
trix. 
1.2 Challenges 
The greatest challenge for determining optimal deception strategies is the exist-
ence of discontinuities in the mapping from the n-space representation of the payoff ma-
trix of a game to the equilibrium value and probabilities of play of the players’ strategies.  
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These knife edges, where the value and strategy profiles of a game change dramatically 
with a small change in the payoff matrix of the game, can be located using stability anal-
ysis as described by Arsham [3] and expanded in this thesis.  When changes to the values 
of cells in the payoff matrix cause the equilibrium strategies of the two players to change, 
the value of the game can change dramatically. 
The existence of these knife edges complicates the development of deceptive 
strategies as games with extremely similar payoff matrices may react very differently to a 
deceptive strategy.  Therefore, measures of similarity based upon distances between the 
payoff matrices of games are incorrect and other methods for determining similarity be-
tween games must be developed in order to make development of deceptive strategies for 
groups of games rather than individual games possible.  The locations of knife edges 
within game space can be determined based upon calculation of the stability of cells with-
in the payoff matrix.  The calculation of cell stability is touched on in Chapter 3 and dis-
cussed at length in Appendix B. 
1.3 Contributions 
The main contributions of this research are an expansion of the definition of the 
stability of cells within a payoff matrix as described by Arsham in [3] to include cells 
outside of the equilibrium of a game, the definition of a set of criteria to evaluate strate-
gies for environmental deception, the creation of an algorithm that performs effective 
environmental deception on any game with minimal information (for use as a baseline for 
evaluation of other environmental deception algorithms), and the development of closed-
form solutions for calculating deceptive strategies that transform a 3x3 game containing a 
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2x2 MSNE into a deceptive game containing a 2x2 MSNE where equilibrium play by the 
mark in the deceptive game provides an increase in value of the game to the deceiver.  It 
is found that the value gain produced by a deceptive algorithm is dependent upon the type 
of game to which it is applied and the maximum amount of allowable change to the pay-
off matrix, emphasizing the importance of carefully selecting an algorithm to match the 
situation to which it is applied.   
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides infor-
mation regarding related work in game theory on topics such as deception, equilibrium 
stability, and equivalence classes of games.  Chapter 3 provides an expanded definition of 
stability for cells in a payoff matrix, describes four methods for generating deceptive 
strategies and provides metrics for comparison between them based upon the necessary 
attributes of a strategy for effective environmental deception.  Chapter 4 presents the re-
sults of applying these algorithms to a set of games and compares the effectiveness of 
each algorithm.  Chapter 5 concludes and makes recommendations for future work.  Ap-
pendix A describes the properties of the games being studied and Appendix B is devoted 
to a discussion of stability analysis. 
  
8 
2. Literature Review 
A rich body of work exists in the field of game theory.  Since game theory can be 
applied to any decision-making process which can be represented as a finite number of 
players and actions and their corresponding payoffs, it can be applied to a variety of prob-
lems.  Fields that commonly use game theory to model decision-making problems in-
clude computer science, economics, and military/political decision making.  
The field of game theory contains a large variety of sub-fields focused on the 
analysis of different types of games, analysis using different techniques, or the study of 
different attributes of games.  For this research, three of the subfields are of interest: de-
ception in game theory, stability analysis of games, and equivalence classes of games.  
The study of deception in game theory is of interest as it relates to the goal of this re-
search: determining effective strategies for environmental deception.  The fields of stabil-
ity analysis of games and equivalence classes of games provide information useful to de-
termining which strategies will be effective for different types of games.  This section 
provides an exploration of the literature that exists on each of these three subjects. 
2.1 Deception in Game Theory 
The use of deception in game theory has been widely studied in the literature; 
however, the type of deception used varies widely from study to study.  The most promi-
nent form of deception in the literature is applied to extensive-form or turn-based games.  
In this deceptive paradigm, the deceiver attempts to make the deceived player believe that 
the deceiver took a different action in their turn than they truly did.  As the game is turn-
based, this affects the decisions of the deceived player, likely leading to an improved 
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payoff to the deceiver in the game.  Since our research uses only normal form games, the 
turn-based form of deception does not apply.   
In [4] and [5], Carroll and Grosu [4] and Garg and Grosu [5] examine deception 
in network security in the context of a signaling game.  A computer is selected to be at-
tacked and the defender sends a signal (truthful or not) that the computer is a honeypot.  
The attacker chooses to attack or not based upon the signal received.  Pibil et al. [6] ex-
tend Carroll, Grosu, and Garg’s research, developing game theoretic models for the opti-
mal use of honeypots.  Zhuang et al. [7] also examine an attacker/defender signaling 
game where the defender sends a signal to the attacker and the attacker updates his belief 
state based on the signal received.  A fourth signaling game is studied by Hespanha et al. 
[8], where the attacker and defender allocate three defensive units over two locations and 
the defender can reveal the location of any number of units to influence the attacker’s 
choice of target. Ma et al. [9] explore attacker/defender signaling games and the use of 
deception for protecting electric grids.  Lee and Teo [10] also study deception in the con-
text of a signaling game.  Their study considers a scenario where one player observes the 
payoff in two boxes and labels them as he wishes.  The other player selects a box and 
receives the payoff contained within, which the first player attempts to minimize.  Lee 
and Teo assume that the first player distorts the information to penalize the second player 
and solve the game using linear equations.   
Yavin [11] studies deception in the context of a pursuer-evader game where the 
evader has the ability to induce errors in the pursuer’s sensors and control the type of er-
rors induced.  Levitin and Hausken [12] study the utility of protecting genuine and false 
targets against a two-phased attack.  They find that the defense of some false targets 
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against the first wave helps to increase the security of the system against the second wave 
of the attack.  Fuchs and Khargonekar [13] study a game in which one player has an in-
formation advantage derived from a sensor net whose information can be corrupted by 
the other player, decreasing their informational advantage.  They develop closed-form 
solutions for a set of situations based upon the solution of dual linear programming prob-
lems and provide a demonstration of the truth of Jones’ lemma. 
An example of deception relevant to our research is described in the work of Lisý 
et al. [14].  In Lisý’s work, the objective is to defeat environmental deception in a surveil-
lance coverage environment.  The goal of the attacker is to perform surveillance to ob-
serve a given geographical region of interest while paying additional attention to certain 
important sites.  The defender in this scenario has a limited ability to change the per-
ceived importance of certain sites, increasing the difficulty of the attacker’s efforts to 
cover the region with the appropriate levels of surveillance.  A method is developed 
which provides the ability to determine, based on the information corrupted by the de-
fender, the sites of interest that require increased surveillance with accuracy better than 
an approach that ignores information regarding sites of interest entirely. 
The relation between our research and that described in Lisý et al.’s work is that 
Lisý studies the same problem with a different purpose.  The ability to modify the appar-
ent importance of sites in the region undergoing surveillance granted to the defender is 
equivalent to a deceptive party’s ability to modify the payoff values of the matrix as per-
ceived by the deceived player.  The difference is that our research determines the optimal 
strategy for the defender while Lisý attempts to optimize the strategy pursued by the at-
tacker performing surveillance.  
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The theory of deception has been studied from multiple different perspectives in 
the literature.  Gharesifard et al. [15, 16, 17] use hypergames to model the changing be-
lief states of players playing games with incomplete information.  This is relevant to the 
study of deception in game theory as the mark in a game where deception is occurring 
has incomplete information.  However, since the games studied here are single-phase 
games, the mark does not have the ability to update their belief state over time, so this 
research does not apply. 
Wagner and Arkin [18, 19] study whether deception should or should not be per-
formed by robots and the type of deception to perform based on the mark.  This relates to 
research on deception in game theory in general, but does not relate to our research as 
opponent modeling is not explored in our work.  Instead, the mark is assumed to be fully 
deceived and play the Nash equilibrium of the deceptive game. 
Greenberg [21, 20] explores the effects of deceiving the mark about the probabil-
ity that a certain state of the world is the truth upon the mark’s choice of strategy.  This is 
relevant to our research as the goal of deception is to affect the mark’s choice of strategy 
by changing their perception of the game being played.  However, Greenberg does not 
provide a mechanism for creating deception, instead studying the effects of the uncertain-
ty caused by deception upon the mark’s choice of strategy.  This differs from our re-
search, where a mechanism for generating a deception that causes the mark to react in a 
desired way is developed. 
Li and Cruz studied the effect of increased information upon the decision making 
of a player and the effects of a deceiver corrupting the additional information upon the 
decision making of the mark in [22].  The work done by Li and Cruz is relevant to our 
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research due to their study of the effects of corrupted information upon the decision mak-
ing of the mark.  However, in their paradigm, the mark has the same base source of in-
formation as the deceiver as well as an additional information source that the deceiver 
can corrupt.  In our research, the mark possesses the same information sources as the de-
ceiver (a means to gather the information necessary to determine the payoff matrix of the 
game being played), but the deceiver has the ability to corrupt all information received by 
the mark.  In this way, the deceiver completely controls the mark’s perception of the state 
of the world. 
2.2 Stability Analysis in Game Theory 
The second area of interest to our work is that of equilibrium stability analysis for 
games.  The stability of a game, as used in this work, measures by how much the payoff 
values of a game’s payoff matrix can be changed without the value and/or equilibrium 
strategy sets of the game being changed.  Previous research and definitions of stability 
analysis in game theory can be expressed in two categories. 
The definition of equilibrium stability most widely found in the literature is pre-
sented by Kohlberg and Mertens [23].  A stable equilibrium by their definition is an equi-
librium in an extensive-form game that is self-enforcing, i.e. no player will ever deviate 
from it.  They provide an example game where the second player deviates from the equi-
librium because they are presented with a choice that provides them with additional in-
formation regarding the state of the game and deviation from the equilibrium in this state 
provides them with an increased payoff.  While interesting, Kohlberg and Mertens’ defi-
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nition of equilibrium stability has no relation to our work because we use a different defi-
nition for stability. 
Only one other line of research presents an alternative definition of stability.  
Arsham [3] provides a definition of stability analysis in game theory that has no relation 
to the definition of equilibrium stability used by Kohlberg and Mertens.  Arsham’s work 
focuses on determining the amount by which a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium’s payoff 
values can be perturbed while still maintaining the original MSNE strategy profile.  
Arsham’s research represents a subset of our work and differs in two major ways.  First, 
Arsham only allows modifying the payoff values of cells within the MSNE (our work 
doesn’t make this restriction).  Second, our work determines how much any value of the 
payoff matrix can be changed while producing an equilibrium that is strategy-equivalent 
to the original game.  By determining the minimum amount of change necessary to 
change the strategy profile of a game, we define the lower bound on cost necessary to 
perform effective environmental deception as defined above. 
2.3 Equivalence Classes of Games 
The final area of interest in this research is that of equivalence classes of games.  
One obvious measure of equivalence could be determined based on the relationship be-
tween the payoff values in a game.  By transforming a payoff matrix to a standard form 
and generating a vector of payoff values for the game, each game can be represented as a 
vector in 9-space.  Unfortunately, due to the knife edges that exist in payoff between 
strategy profiles, the Euclidean or Manhattan distance proximity of two 3x3 games in 9-
space does not necessarily imply that they have similar equilibrium strategy and value.  
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Since normal distance measures are not applicable, it is necessary to determine new 
measures of similarity between games that provide information that helps in determining 
effective deceptive strategies for a game.  For this reason, literature in the area of equiva-
lence classes is reviewed here.  
Several forms of equivalence classes are introduced in the literature.  Commonly 
used equivalence classes are zero-sum versus non-zero-sum games, cooperative versus 
common interest versus competitive games, and strategic versus extensive form games 
[24].  Other equivalence classes defined in the literature are Nash equivalence classes, 
rationalizable strategy-equivalence classes, iterated strict dominance equivalence classes, 
correlated equilibrium equivalence classes, best response equivalence classes, better re-
sponse equivalence classes, and von Neumann-Morgenstern equivalence classes. 
Germano defines equivalence relationships as relations on a space of games that 
map games from this space into sets [25].  Equivalence classes are the various sets that 
the games are mapped to, separated by those games for which the relation is discontinu-
ous.  The number of equivalence classes is further decreased through the use of transfor-
mation of games by relabeling the players and/or their actions to determine games iso-
morphic to the original game. 
Nash equivalence is defined by Germano [24, 25].  This definition states that two 
games are Nash equivalent if there exists a transformation of the second game such that a 
continuous path through the space of games exists between the first game and the trans-
formed second game.  In this context, a continuous path refers to a series of isomorphic 
transformations to the game and/or changes to the payoff values of the game such that no 
modification crosses a knife edge in the mapping from payoff values to strategy profiles 
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where a small change in payoffs yields a large change in strategy.  Germano finds that the 
set of 2x2 games can be divided into three classes of Nash equivalent games, while thirty-
two Nash equivalence classes exist for 3x3 games. 
Germano also introduces equivalence classes based upon the concepts of 
rationalizable strategies, iterated strict dominance, and correlated equilibria.  
Rationalizable strategies [26] are those that best respond to an opponent’s strategy 
(whether or not the opponent’s selection is in the Nash equilibrium).  Iterated strict domi-
nance involves the sequential elimination of strictly dominated strategies until no such 
strategies remain [27].  A strictly dominated strategy for a player is one for which another 
strategy provides a better payoff to the player for all of the possible strategies their oppo-
nent can play.  Correlated equilibria are defined by Aumann [28] as the strategies that 
would be selected by each player to maximize their expected payoffs given a probability 
distribution of all of the states in the world.  Equilibrium classes based upon 
rationalizable strategies and iterated strict dominance can be created by counting the 
number of rationalizable strategies or strategies surviving iterated strict dominance elimi-
nation for both players.  Two games are defined to be equivalent based upon correlated 
equilibrium relations if a continuous path exists between one game and the transformed 
second game such that the dimension of the set of correlated equilibria remains constant 
[24]. 
Morris and Ui [29] introduce best response, better response, and von Neumann-
Morgenstern equivalence classes.  Two games are defined to be best response equivalent 
if for every pair of strategies the ratio of payoff differences of switching between the 
strategies is always the same, positive number wi.  For two games to be better response 
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equivalent, they must have the same dominance relations between strategies and for eve-
ry pair of strategies that do not strictly dominate each other, the ratio of payoff differ-
ences for switching between the strategies is always the same, positive value, wi.  Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern equivalent games have the relationship that for any two strategies 
for a player, the ratio of payoff differences is always the same, positive value wi where wi 
is the same for all pairs of strategies. 
The equivalence classes introduced in this thesis, value equivalence and strategy-
equivalence, are a special case of the Nash equivalence class [24].  Germano found that 
after allowing transformations to identify isomorphically equivalent games that the three 
resulting equivalence classes of 3x3 games corresponded to the types of equilibria con-
tained within the games: 1) a single pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, 2) a single mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium, and 3) a single mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium co-existing 
with two pure-strategy Nash equilibria.   
The notion of strategic equivalence as defined in our work is identical to 
Germano’s Nash equivalence; simplification of equivalence classes based upon isomor-
phic equivalence classes is also used in our research.  Three key points differentiate our 
work and Germano’s: 1) the retention of the value of the game as an important feature in 
equivalence classes, 2) the restriction to constant-sum games and the resulting effects 
upon the derived equivalence classes, and 3) the consideration of multiple pure-strategy 
Nash equilibria with the same value within a game. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the terminology and 
research relating to this work.  The next chapter describes the proposed algorithms for 
generation of deceptive strategies. 
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3. Environmental Deception Strategy Generation 
The goal of this thesis is the development of strategies for effective environmental 
deception.  This chapter begins by describing the stability of cells within the payoff ma-
trix of a game.  This information is useful for environmental deception as it shows where 
deception can be applied most profitably to the deceiver.  Next, some metrics for evaluat-
ing environmental deceptive strategies are defined for use in Chapter 4 to evaluate the 
deceptive strategy generation algorithms described in this thesis.  The final third of this 
chapter describes the four deceptive strategy generation algorithms in detail, leading into 
the analysis of their effectiveness and comparative performance in Chapter 4. 
3.1 Equilibrium Stability of Two-Player Constant-Sum Games 
The stability of a cell in the payoff matrix of a game reflects its ability to change 
the value and/or equilibrium strategy set of a game.  The stability of a cell is used here to 
refer to the minimum value by which a cell can be modified and cause the equilibrium of 
the game to change in value or strategy profile.  This information is useful as it provides 
targeting information for modifications to the payoff matrix presented to the mark when 
environmental deception is being performed.   
Two forms of stability are explored in this section.  The value stability of a cell is 
the amount by which the value of the cell can be changed without the equilibrium value 
of the game being changed.  The strategy stability of a cell is the amount by which the 
cell may be modified without changing the equilibrium strategy set of the row or column 
player. 
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The stability of a cell is dependent upon the type of Nash equilibrium contained 
within the game, pure-strategy or mixed-strategy, and the location of the cell in relation 
to the game’s equilibrium.  In this section, a brief summary of the stability of cells for 
each location and each equilibrium type is presented.  A more complete explanation is 
presented in Appendix B. 
The stability of a cell depends on its location relative to the equilibrium of the 
game.  The four stability regions are the equilibrium itself, cells within the row of equi-
librium cell(s), cells that share a column with equilibrium cell(s), and cells that share nei-
ther a row nor a column with equilibrium cells.  This section provides stability equations 
for cells in each of the four regions for games containing pure-strategy Nash equilibria 
and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. 
3.1.1 Stability of Games Containing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria 
The first case considered for stability analysis is for games containing a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE).  In games containing PSNEs, the equilibrium cell(s) 
must be the minimum in their row and the maximum in their column based on payoffs 
from the perspective of the row player (see Appendix A for more details).   This is im-
portant to stability analysis as the stability of a cell in a game containing a PSNE game is 
equal to the amount by which that cell may be modified without violating these condi-
tions for the equilibrium. 
Another important property of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in constant-sum 
games is that only a single unique-valued equilibrium can exist in such a game.  If multi-
ple PSNEs cells exist in a game, they must have the same value and every cell at the in-
tersection of a row containing a PSNE cell and a column containing a PSNE cell must 
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also be a PSNE cell with the same value (see Appendix A for a proof of this statement).  
If such a multi-cell PSNE exists within a game, it affects the stability calculation for the 
game as well. 
Table 1 displays the stability bounds of cells based upon their location within the 
game and the type of PSNE contained within the game (single cell or multi-cell).  Stabil-
ity bounds refer to the maximum amount of modification m that can be applied to a cell 
while retaining the original equilibrium value or strategy profile.  Equations 1 and 2  pro-
vide the definitions for 𝑟′ and 𝑐′ used within Table 1, where 𝑟 is the value of a cell within 
the row of equilibrium cell(s) and 𝑐 is the value of a cell sharing a column with equilibri-
um cell(s). 
 𝑟′ =  min (𝑟) (1) 
 𝑐′ =  max (𝑐) (2) 
Table 1. Stability Bounds for Games Containing PSNEs 
Modification Location Value Stability Strategy Stability 
Equilibrium Location 
(single-cell PSNE) 𝑚 ≠ min�min(𝑟 − 𝑣) ,min(𝑣 − 𝑐) � 𝑚 < min�min(𝑟 − 𝑣) ,min(𝑣 − 𝑐) � 
Equilibrium Location 
(multi-cell PSNE) 
𝑚 unbounded 𝑚 = 0 
Row of Equilibrium 
(single row of PSNEs) 
𝑚 < 𝑟′ − 𝑣 𝑚 < 𝑟′ − 𝑣 
Row of Equilibrium 
(multiple rows of PSNEs) 
𝑚 unbounded 𝑚 < 𝑟′ − 𝑣 
Column of Equilibrium 
(single column of PSNEs) 
𝑚 > 𝑐′ − 𝑣 𝑚 > 𝑐′ − 𝑣 
Column of Equilibrium 
(multiple rows of PSNEs) 
𝑚 unbounded 𝑚 > 𝑐′ − 𝑣 
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3.1.2 Stability of Cells Containing Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria 
The second case considered here is the stability of cells within games that contain 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (MSNEs).  In Appendix A, a proof is provided that only a 
single PSNE can exist in a two-player, constant-sum game, so this case is distinct from 
that of the previous section.  Like the section on PSNEs, the stability bounds of cells are 
defined here based upon location within the payoff matrix with a more in-depth explana-
tion provided in Appendix B. 
Table 2 presents the stability bounds for cells in a game containing a MSNE based 
upon the relative location of the cells to the MSNE.  In Table 2, the values of 𝑟′ and 𝑐′ 
are defined in Equations 3 and 4, where v is the value of the game, r is the value of a cell 
in the row of the equilibrium, 𝑟′′ is the value of the other cell in the row of the equilibri-
um (assuming a 2x2 MSNE), c is the value of a cell in the column of the equilibrium, 𝑐′′ 
is the other cell in the column of the equilibrium, and p and q are the probabilities that the 
strategies resulting in 𝑟′ or 𝑐′ are played. 
 
𝑟′ = min�𝑣 − (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑟′′
𝑝
� (3) 
 
𝑐′ = min (𝑣 − (1 − 𝑞) ∙ 𝑐′′
𝑞
) (4) 
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Table 2. Stability Bounds for Games Containing MSNEs. 
Modification Location Value Stability Strategy Stability 
Equilibrium Location 𝑚 = 0 𝑚 = 0 
Row of Equilibrium 𝑚 < 𝑟′ 𝑚 < 𝑟′ 
Column of Equilibrium 𝑚 > −𝑐′ 𝑚 > −𝑐′ 
 
3.2 Success Criteria for Deceptive Strategies 
The development of an effective strategy for environmental deception is a multi-
objective optimization problem.  A strong deceptive strategy must provide a large benefit 
to the deceiver, be attainable, and work effectively under many opponent models.  All of 
these requirements translate directly to constraints that can be used to evaluate possible 
deceptive strategies during the generation process.  This section describes value gain, 
deceptive cost, benefit delay, believability, opponent risk, and efficiency and their impact 
on the effectiveness of a strategy for environmental deception. 
Value gain is the most significant of the criteria when selecting a strategy for en-
vironmental deception because an increase in the value of the game from the perspective 
of the deceptive player is the reason for performing environmental deception.  A decep-
tive strategy that provides no benefit to the deceiver is a waste of resources and should 
not be pursued.   
The value gain of a deceptive strategy is measured as the difference in the payoff 
value of the game to the deceptive player when the mark plays a strategy based upon the 
Nash equilibrium of the deceptive game and the payoff value when deception does not 
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occur.  The goal of the deceiver is to select a strategy that maximizes this value given the 
other constraints on his possible deceptive strategy choices. 
Deceptive cost is a constraint on the possible deceptive strategies the deceiver can 
employ that is based upon the resources available to the deceiver and their effects upon 
his ability to perform deception.  The deceptive cost is measured as the Manhattan dis-
tance from the deceptive game from the original game or the sum of the absolute values 
of the changes of the payoff values of each cell of the payoff matrix.  This cost function 
is shown in Equation 5, where 𝑑 represents the deceptive game, 𝑜 represents the original 
game, and 𝑙 is the number of cells in both payoff matrices. 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = �𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑑[𝑖] − 𝑜[𝑖])𝑙
𝑖=1
 (5) 
Another constraint related to the deceptive cost is the maximum allowable cost of 
deception.  The maximum allowable cost of deception states the amount of resources 
available to the deceiver and limits the possible deceptive strategies that can be em-
ployed.  If the cost of the cheapest effective deceptive strategy, i.e. the strategy with min-
imum deceptive cost and a positive value gain, exceeds the maximum cost of deception, 
environmental deception is impractical.  Selection of a deceptive strategy is a multi-
objective optimization problem which attempts to maximize value gain while minimizing 
deceptive cost. 
Maximum allowable cost can be defined in different ways depending on the situa-
tion being modeled by the game.  The maximum cost can relate to the payoff matrix as a 
whole, bounding the sum of the costs applied to each cell, or be defined on a cell-by-cell 
basis, bounding the maximum allowable change to each cell of the matrix.  Maximum 
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cost values can also be set values or percentages based upon the values of the cells of the 
payoff matrix.  Finally, the deceptive cost can be completely unconstrained with the de-
ception focused solely on maximization of the value gain achieved. 
The benefit delay of an algorithm for environmental deception measures whether 
the deceiver must apply units of deceptive cost with no benefit before reaching a condi-
tion where the deception causes an increase in value to the deceiver.  The algorithms de-
scribed in this work are labeled as having no benefit delay if the application of deceptive 
cost immediately produces increases in value gain to the deceiver or having a benefit de-
lay if some deceptive cost must be applied with no value gain to the deceiver to achieve a 
condition where the value of the game increases for the deceiver due to deception. 
Believability of deception is an important factor in the selection of a strategy for 
environmental deception.  Environmental deception cannot modify the actual state of the 
world, only the mark’s perception of it.  If the result of the mark’s and deceiver’s choice 
of strategy results in a cell where the deceiver has performed deception, the mark will be 
aware of the deception when he receives a payoff different from the payoff which he an-
ticipates.  This may affect the strategy of the mark in future games as he now anticipates 
the possibility of deception and adjusts his play accordingly.  Therefore, if it is desirable 
that deception is sustainable over multiple games or if it is necessary that the mark does 
not realize the deception even after payoffs are received, a deceptive strategy that is be-
lievable to the mark is desirable. 
Believable environmental deception requires only that the payoff received by the 
mark be the payoff expected given knowledge of the actions taken by both players.  As 
the mark’s choice of actions is not under the control of the deceiver, any payoffs reacha-
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ble given the deceiver’s chosen strategy profile must remain unmodified.  With the de-
ceiver as the row player, this means that all cells in the rows of a strategy that the deceiv-
er might play must remain unchanged in the deception since there is no guarantee that the 
opponent is rational or believes the deceptive game.   
Each algorithm described in this chapter will be labeled as having high, medium, 
or low believability.  A highly believable algorithm never produces a deceptive strategy 
in which the mark can receive a payoff value that has been changed in the deceptive 
game.  An algorithm with medium believability does not produce deceptive strategies 
where a rational, deceived mark (i.e. one playing a strategy derived from the Nash equi-
librium of the deceptive game) will receive a payoff that has been modified in the decep-
tive game.  An algorithm with low believability produces deceptive strategies where a 
mark can receive payoffs that have been modified in the deceptive game even if he plays 
at the Nash equilibrium of the deceptive game. 
Opponent risk refers to the potential for loss of value to the deceiver due to an ir-
rational or suspicious opponent.  When presenting a deceptive game to an opponent, the 
deceiver hopes that the opponent will play in a predictable way, preferably using the 
strategy profile defined by the Nash equilibrium of the deceptive game.  An irrational 
opponent may deviate from this equilibrium strategy by accident and provide a greater or 
lesser payoff to the deceiver as a result.  A suspicious player may suspect that deception 
is being performed and deliberately play with a strategy differing from that suggested by 
the deceptive game in hopes of achieving a better payoff than if he played into the decep-
tion.  Regardless of cause, there exists the possibility that an opponent may not act in the 
way intended by the deceiver while crafting the deceptive game. 
25 
Opponent risk describes how much an irrational or suspicious opponent can re-
duce the value of the game for a deceiver using a given deceptive strategy.  The algo-
rithms presented in this thesis are labeled as having high or low opponent risk.  Each al-
gorithm for generating deceptive strategies classified as having high or low opponent 
risk.  A high value of opponent risk indicates that a deceptive strategy is highly depend-
ent upon the mark playing the equilibrium strategy of the deceptive game.  If the mark 
deviates from the deceptive game’s equilibrium, the value of the game to the deceptive 
player is decreased significantly.  A deceptive strategy has low opponent risk if the de-
ceptive player plays in a way that is rational for the true game, therefore receiving a pay-
off at or near the value of the true game if the mark does not play the equilibrium of the 
deceptive game.   
An ideal deceptive strategy minimizes opponent risk; however, this is a tradeoff 
with the value gain of the deception.  If the deceiver plays at the equilibrium of the true 
game, he has low opponent risk; however, he may not gain as much value from deception 
as if he played a strategy that accounts for the deception performed and the mark’s ex-
pected response to it.  Conversely, playing based upon the deceptive game may increase 
the value of the game to the deceiver but risks the deceiver receiving a lower payoff from 
the game if the mark is not deceived and plays a strategy based upon knowledge of the 
deception. 
The efficiency of an algorithm for generating strategies for environmental decep-
tion measures the length of time it takes on average for the algorithm to generate a decep-
tive strategy for a game.  This criterion is important as the development of a deceptive 
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strategy may be time-sensitive and an algorithm that cannot provide an effective decep-
tion strategy within the allotted time is no better than having no algorithm at all. 
The games described in the following section will be labeled as having high, me-
dium, or low efficiency in Chapter 4.  A highly efficient algorithm has complexity on the 
order of 𝑂(1) or constant time.  An algorithm with medium efficiency has efficiency on 
the order of 𝑂(𝑚) where 𝑚 is the size of the game’s payoff matrix.  An algorithm with 
low efficiency has complexity worse than 𝑂(𝑚). 
3.3 Environmental Deception Strategy Generation for 3x3 Games 
While the number of deceptive games that can be derived from a given game in-
creases exponentially with the maximum allowable cost, many of these games provide 
little or no deceptive benefit to the deceptive player or are outperformed by other games 
with regard to value gain for cost spent.  This section describes methods by which games 
that provide a benefit to the deceptive player can be determined from an initial game. 
The algorithms presented in this section are based on the assumption that decep-
tion must have high or medium believability.  As defined previously, high believability 
means that an opponent will never receive a payoff modified as part of the deception.  
Medium believability means that a rational opponent playing the Nash equilibrium of the 
deceptive game will not receive a payoff modified as a result of deception.  This first al-
gorithm presented here has medium believability, while the rest have high believability.  
The first algorithm presented, the naïve algorithm, is a simple algorithm that uses 
the minimum possible amount of information necessary to perform effective deception in 
a game containing any type of equilibrium.  The remainder of the section is devoted to 
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descriptions of methods by which games containing mixed-strategy Nash equilibria can 
be transformed to the benefit of the deceptive player.  These methods are equilibrium-
preserving deception and equilibrium-destroying deception applied to rows or columns. 
  
Figure 1. Labeling of 3x3 Game Payoffs and Probabilities. 
The methods for deception described in this section are based upon the relation-
ships between payoffs in 3x3 two-player, sum-to-one games.  In a sum-to-one game, the 
payoffs for both players within a cell add to one, so a gain to one player represents an 
equal loss to the other.  The methods use the labeling of cells and strategies in the payoff 
matrix shown in Figure 1, where payoffs are from the perspective of the deceptive row 
player.  The values of 𝑝 and 𝑞 in Figure 1 represent the probabilities that the row and col-
umn players play the strategies in the top row and leftmost column respectively.  The 
games are structured so that all equilibrium cells are in the top, left corner, and the high-
est value cell in the equilibrium is at location a and cells along the diagonal of the equi-
librium starting at a are the greatest in their row and column of the equilibrium. 
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3.3.1 Naïve Algorithm 
The first algorithm proposed for the generation of deceptive strategies is the naïve 
algorithm.  Currently, there exists no baseline for the evaluation of deceptive strategy 
generation.  A baseline environmental deception algorithm would accomplish the goal of 
performing effective deception, i.e. deception that produces a positive value gain for the 
deceiver, while using the minimum possible amount of knowledge of game theory, i.e. 
ability to compute the equilibrium value and strategy profile of a random game. The na-
ïve algorithm attempts to fill this gap. 
This algorithm makes uses of the knowledge of the payoff value of the starting 
game for the deceptive player and the properties of Nash equilibria in constant-sum 
games (see Appendix A).  This section begins with the description and rationale for the 
use of this information, followed by a description of the resulting algorithm. 
The value of the initial game to the deceptive player is defined as the expected 
functionality of the deceiver’s systems after an attack if both players play rationally with 
strategies derived from the Nash equilibrium.  It is necessary to provide this information 
to the naïve algorithm as it allows the algorithm to determine if the goal of improving the 
deceiver’s payoff has been accomplished.  The calculation of this value is shown in 
Equation 6, where 𝑅 and 𝐶 are the rows and columns of the payoff matrix, 𝑝𝑥 is the prob-
ability that the row/column player plays row/column 𝑥, and 𝑓𝑟,𝑐 is the deceiver’s payoff 
found at row 𝑟 and column 𝑐 of the payoff matrix. 
 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = ��𝑝𝑟 ∙ 𝑝𝑐 ∙ 𝑓𝑟,𝑐
𝑐∈𝐶𝑟∈𝑅
 (6) 
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The other piece of information provided to the naïve algorithm is the properties of 
pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNEs) in two-player, constant-sum games.  These proper-
ties, described in Appendix A, are derived from the fact that, in a PSNE, neither player 
has incentive to change from the equilibrium strategy.   
The knowledge of the properties of pure strategy Nash equilibria in two-player, 
constant-sum games is necessary for the baseline algorithm because it allows the algo-
rithm to complete its goal with no other knowledge of the state of the modified game.  If 
one or more cells exist that fulfill the constraints described by the first two properties, 
then PSNEs exist in that game with the value of those cells.  Otherwise, a mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibrium (MSNE) exists in the game and more information regarding the rela-
tionships between the cells of the payoff matrix is necessary to determine the value of the 
game.  As the purpose of the naïve algorithm is to provide a baseline where decisions are 
based upon the minimum possible amount of information, it is desirable that the naïve 
algorithm only creates games containing PSNEs and does not need to calculate the value 
of games containing MSNEs (assuming that the value of the initial game is provided to it 
so it can determine if the deceptive game provides a higher value to the deceiver). 
With this information in mind, it is now possible to define an algorithm to act as a 
baseline for comparison to other methods of developing deceptive strategies.  The pro-
posed algorithm accomplishes the goal by selecting all cells with values greater than or 
equal to the value of the initial game as potential equilibria and creates potential decep-
tive games with pure strategy Nash equilibria at these locations.  This is accomplished by 
modifying the values of the cells in the row and column of each potential equilibrium so 
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that their relationships to the equilibrium cell fulfill the constraints defined by the first 
two properties of PSNEs as described in Appendix A. 
These potential final games are then evaluated for their ability to fulfill the cost 
constraints of the scenario.  The cost of the deception is calculated as the Manhattan dis-
tance between the payoff vectors, and all potential final games with a cost higher than the 
defined threshold are eliminated from the pool of potential options.  If multiple potential 
final games still exist, then the final game with the highest ratio of value gain to decep-
tive cost is returned as the result of the algorithm. 
Algorithm 1. Naïve Algorithm 
function NaiveAlgorithm(payoff matrix, maxCost, stepSize)  
returns modified payoff matrix maximizing value gain with cost as tie-
breaker 
𝑜, 𝑟 ← payoff matrix 
𝐺𝐿 ← [] // List of cells with value greater than original game value 
// Determines potential equilibrium cells for deceptive game 
for i=1:length(o) 
  if 𝑜[𝑖]  >  getEqValue(𝑜) 
    𝐺𝐿 ← [𝐺𝐿; 𝑖] 
𝜀 ← minimum step size of cost (stepSize) 
for each cell 𝑔 in GL do 
    𝑣 ← payoff value at 𝑔 
  𝑠 ← 𝑜 // Initialize potential modified game with PSNE at 𝑔 
  // Create desired PSNE 
    for each cell c in column of 𝑔 
        𝑠[𝑐]  ←  min(𝑠[𝑐], 𝑣 –  𝜀) 
    for each cell r in row of 𝑔 
        𝑠[𝑟]  ←  max(𝑠[𝑟], 𝑣 +  𝜀) 
  if getCost(𝑠, 𝑜) > 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 
    continue 
  // Replace current game if new game is better 
  if getEqValue(𝑠)  >  getEqValue (𝑟) || (getEqValue(𝑠)  ==  getEqValue(𝑟) && getCost(𝑠, 𝑜) < getCost(𝑟, 𝑜)) 
      𝑟 ← 𝑠 
return 𝑟 
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function getCost(revised payoff matrix, original payoff matrix) 
returns  cost to change from original matrix to revised matrix 
𝑟 ← revised payoff matrix 
𝑜 ← original payoff matrix 
𝑐 ←0 
for each cell i in r 
  𝑐 ← 𝑐 + abs(𝑟[𝑖] − 𝑜[𝑖]) 
return c 
 
This naïve algorithm is defined in pseudocode in Algorithm 1 and presents a base-
line for evaluation of other algorithms for the generation of deceptive strategies.  Some 
representative results of the performance of this algorithm are presented in Chapter 4. 
3.3.2 Equilibrium-Preserving Deception 
The equilibrium-preserving method of environmental deception is intended to in-
crease the value of the game to the evader while retaining the equilibrium strategy set of 
the original game for both players.  The benefit for the deceiver in environmental decep-
tion is derived from influencing the mark to change the probability that he plays the strat-
egies available to him. 
For the equilibrium-preserving method of deception, three possible scenarios are 
explored.  In all scenarios, the mark plays at the Nash equilibrium of the deceptive game 
and it is assumed that the true game contains a MSNE in cells a, b, d, and e.  In the first 
scenario, the deceiver plays his equilibrium strategies with the probabilities suggested by 
the true game.  In the second scenario, the deceiver selects a strategy from the equilibri-
um to play before developing the deceptive game.  In the third scenario, the deceiver 
plays the Nash equilibrium of the deceptive game. 
Equations 7, 8 and 9 provide information about the value of the game derived 
from knowledge of the Nash equilibrium, using the labeling of cells presented in   
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Figure 1 1.  As stated previously, the true game is assumed to have a 2x2 MSNE 
containing cells a, b, d, and e.  As the equilibria of the true and deceptive games contain 
the same cells, these equations apply to both if a cell is replaced by its modified value for 
the deceptive game.  Equation 7 presents the canonical definition for the value of the 
game.  Equations 8 and 9 are based upon knowledge of the Nash equilibrium and the fact 
that the row or column player must receive equal value from each of his strategies within 
the equilibrium (so he is indifferent between then) and less value from strategies outside 
the equilibrium (so he has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium).  From Equation 
8, the probabilities of play p and q of the deceiver and mark can be calculated as shown 
in Equations 10 and 11. 
 𝑣 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ (1 − 𝑞) (7) 
 
 𝑣 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑏 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) = 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) = 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) (8) 
 
 𝑔 ∙ 𝑞 + ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞) < 𝑣 < 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑓 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) (9) 
 
 𝑝 = −𝑑 + 𝑒
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (10) 
 
 𝑞 =  −𝑏 + 𝑒
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (11) 
 
Using the information in Equations 7-11, the three cases for equilibrium-
preserving deception can be considered. 
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3.3.2.1 True Equilibrium 
The first scenario considered for equilibrium-preserving deception is one where the de-
ceiver creates a deceptive game but plays at the Nash equilibrium of the true game.  The 
goal of this deception is to increase the value of the game for the deceiver while main-
taining believability, i.e. no payoffs that the evader may receive as a result of gameplay 
may be modified as part of the deception.  With the deceiver playing the true equilibrium 
of the original game, this means that all cells in a row that the deceiver may play, a-f in 
Figure 1, cannot be modified by the deception.  As shown in Equation 7, the value of the 
true and deceptive games are based completely upon the values of cells a, b, d, and e.  
Therefore, equilibrium-preserving environmental deception cannot be both effective and 
believable if the deceiver plays the Nash equilibrium of the true game. 
3.3.2.2 Chosen Action 
In chosen action deception, the deceiver selects a strategy to play from the equi-
librium of the true game and creates a deceptive game that increases the value of the 
game for the deceiver if he plays his selected strategy and the mark plays the equilibrium 
of the deceptive game.  As described earlier, the games are structured so that the maxi-
mum value in the equilibrium of the game is located at a.  Therefore, in chosen action 
deception, the deceiver plays the top row strategy and attempts to increase the probability 
that he receives the payoff at location a. 
To increase the probability that he will receive payoff a, the deceiver must in-
crease the probability of q for the mark in the deceptive game.  Unlike the previous case, 
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the deceiver selects a strategy to play before developing the deceptive game, allowing 
modification of cells within the equilibrium at d and e. 
Equation 12 shows the minimum amount, s, by which d can be increased in order 
to achieve the desired increase to q in the deceptive game.  
 𝑞′ > 𝑞 
−𝑏 + 𝑒
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒 > −𝑏 + 𝑒𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒)(𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) − 𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) 0 > −𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) 
𝑠 > 0 
(12) 
As shown in Equation 12, the only condition necessary to achieve the desired in-
crease to q’ is that s must be greater than zero, therefore any increase to the value of d 
increases the value of q in the deceptive game.  Equation 13 provides a similar analysis of 
the minimum increase, t, to the value of e necessary to increase the value of q in the de-
ceptive game over that of the true game.  
 𝑞′ > 𝑞 
−𝑏 + 𝑒 + 𝑡
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑡 > −𝑏 + 𝑒𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (−𝑏 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) + 𝑡 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) 
𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) + 𝑡 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) > 𝑡 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) 
𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) > 0 
𝑡 > 0 
(13) 
As shown in Equation 13, any increase to the value of e also increases the value 
of q in the deceptive game (since the amount by which it is increased, t, must only be 
greater than zero).  However, while increases to d and e help to create the desired value 
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of q in the deceptive game, increasing them by too large an amount may destroy the de-
sired equilibrium in the deceptive game.  Equation 14 shows the calculation of a bound 
on the amount, s, by which d can be increased while preserving the desired equilibrium. 
 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝′ + (𝑑 + 𝑠) ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) < 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑓 ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) 
𝑎 ∙ 𝑝′ + (𝑑 + 𝑠) − (𝑑 + 𝑠) ∙ 𝑝′ < 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑓 − 𝑓 ∙ 𝑝′ 
𝑝′ ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) < −𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓 
−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) < −𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓 (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) < (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) + (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) < (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) ∙ (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) + (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) < (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) (−𝑑 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) − 𝑠 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) < (−𝑑 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) − 𝑠 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) 
𝑠 ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) < (−𝑑 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) − (−𝑑 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) 
(14) 
Whether the calculations in Equation 14 provide an upper or lower bound on the 
acceptable value for the amount of change, s, to d is dependent upon the values of b and 
c.  Regardless, Equation 14 provides useful information regarding possible changes for 
effective equilibrium-preserving deception in 2x2 MSNEs.  Equation 15 provides a simi-
lar calculation for the maximum change, t, to the value of e that does not destroy the de-
sired equilibrium in the deceptive game. 
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 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝′ + (𝑒 + 𝑡) ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) < 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑓 ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) 
𝑏 ∙ 𝑝′ + (𝑒 + 𝑡) − (𝑒 + 𝑡) ∙ 𝑝′ < 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑓 − 𝑓 ∙ 𝑝′ 
𝑝′ ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 − 𝑡 + 𝑓) < −𝑒 − 𝑡 + 𝑓 
−𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑡
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 − 𝑡 + 𝑓) < −𝑒 − 𝑡 + 𝑓 (−𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 − 𝑡 + 𝑓) < (−𝑒 − 𝑡 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) (−𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) ∙ (−𝑒 − 𝑡 + 𝑓) + (−𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) < (−𝑒 − 𝑡 + 𝑓) ∙ (−𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) + (−𝑒 − 𝑡 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) (−𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) < (−𝑒 − 𝑡 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) (−𝑑 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) < (−𝑒 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) − 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) 
𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) < (−𝑒 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) − (−𝑑 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) 
(15) 
Whether Equation 15 represents an upper or lower bound upon the possible 
changes, t, to e is dependent upon the values of a and c.  The final consideration of inter-
est is whether increasing d or e has a greater effect on the value of q in the deceptive 
game.  Equation 16 determines the conditions necessary for changing d to be more bene-
ficial to the deceiver than changing e. 
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 −𝑏 + 𝑒
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒 > −𝑏 + 𝑒 + 𝑡𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑡 (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) 
 (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) + (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ 𝑡> (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) ∙ 𝑠 + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) + 𝑡 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) 
 
𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) > 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) 
𝑠 > 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑)(−𝑏 + 𝑒 + 𝑡) 
𝑎 − 𝑑
−𝑏 + 𝑒 + 𝑡 < 1 
𝑎 − 𝑑 < −𝑏 + 𝑒 + 𝑡 
𝑡 > 𝑎 + 𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝑒 
(16) 
Equation 16 shows the conditions necessary for changing d to be more effective 
than changing e for the deceiver.  As shown, if the value of e is increased by a value, t, 
that is more than 𝑎 + 𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝑒, then modifying d is more effective than modifying e.  The 
decision of how to perform equilibrium-preserving deception should be based upon this 
information and the boundary conditions described in Equations 14 and 15. 
3.3.2.3 Deceptive Equilibrium 
Equilibrium-preserving deception where the deceiver plays the equilibrium of the 
deceptive game has the same issues as equilibrium-preserving deception where the de-
ceiver plays the equilibrium of the true game.  In order for deception to be effective, the 
value of the game must increase as a result of the deception.  However, the value of the 
game is based solely on the value of cells within the game’s equilibrium.  If the deceiver 
is playing at the equilibrium of the deceptive game, which contains the same strategies as 
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the true game’s equilibrium, then effective deception cannot be believable since it would 
require changing the values of payoffs which may be received by the mark. 
3.3.3 Equilibrium-Destroying Deception (Rows) 
The third method of deception considered is row-changing equilibrium-destroying 
deception.  In this case, the deceptive game’s equilibrium contains one of the row play-
er’s original equilibrium strategies and the other original equilibrium strategy for the row 
player is replaced by the strategy outside the equilibrium in the true game. 
For all cases, Equations 17, 18, and 19 provide information about the value of the 
true game derived from knowledge of the Nash equilibrium.  The equations also use the 
labeling of the cells and probabilities of play shown in Figure 1.  From Equation 18, the 
probabilities of play p and q of the deceiver and mark can be calculated as shown in 
Equations 20 and 21. 
 𝑣 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ (1 − 𝑞) (17) 
 
 𝑣 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑏 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) = 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) = 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) (18) 
 
 𝑔 ∙ 𝑞 + ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞) < 𝑣 < 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑓 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) (19) 
 
 𝑝 = −𝑑 + 𝑒
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (20) 
 
 𝑞 =  −𝑏 + 𝑒
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (21) 
As the deceptive game contains an equilibrium different from that of the true 
game, Equations 17-21 do not apply.  Equations 22, 23, and 24 show calculations of the 
value of the deceptive game based upon knowledge of the Nash equilibrium, using the 
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labeling provided in Figure 1. Equations 25 and 26 are based on Equation 23 and provide 
the Nash equilibrium probabilities 𝑝′ and 𝑞′ that the row player and column player play 
the top row and leftmost column strategies of the deceptive game. 
 𝑣′ = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝′ ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝′ ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) + 𝑔 ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) ∙ 𝑞′ + ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) (22) 
 
 𝑣′ = 𝑎′ ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑏′ ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) = 𝑔′ ∙ 𝑞′ + ℎ′ ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) = 𝑎′ ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑔′ ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) = 𝑏′ ∙ 𝑝′ + ℎ′ ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) (23) 
 
 𝑑′ ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) < 𝑣′ < 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑓 ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) (24) 
 
 𝑝′ = −𝑔′ + ℎ′
𝑎′ − 𝑏′ − 𝑔′ + ℎ′ (25) 
 
 𝑞′ = −𝑏′ + ℎ′
𝑎′ − 𝑏′ − 𝑔′ + ℎ′ (26) 
 
Using Equations 17-26, the three cases for row-changing, equilibrium-destroying 
deception can be considered. 
3.3.3.1 True Equilibrium 
The first case considered for equilibrium-destroying deception where the actions 
of the row player (deceiver) are changed is when the deceiver plays the equilibrium of the 
true game.  Under these circumstances the deceiver may appear irrational to the mark 
since there exists the possibility that the deceiver will play an action outside the equilibri-
um of the deceptive game. 
If the apparent rationality of the deceiver is unimportant, then believable decep-
tion using the row-changing, equilibrium-destroying method of deception is possible 
while playing the equilibrium of the true game.  For deception to be effective, the value 
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of the game must increase as a result of deception, as shown in the first line of Equation 
27.  The values of the game used in the first line of Equation 27 are based upon the defi-
nition shown in Equation 17.  The mixing of 𝑝 and 𝑞′ in the first half of the first line of 
Equation 27 is intentional as the row player plays at the equilibrium of the true game 
(with probabilities 𝑝 and 1 − 𝑝) and the column player plays at the equilibrium of the 
deceptive game (with probabilities 𝑞′ and 1 − 𝑞′). 
 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ (1 − 𝑞′)> 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ (1 − 𝑞) 
 
𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 − 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑒 − 𝑒 ∙ 𝑝 − 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞′> 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 − 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 − 𝑒 ∙ 𝑝 − 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞 
 
𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞′ − 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞′ − 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞′> 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞 
 
𝑞′ ∙ �𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 − 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) − 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝)� > 𝑞 ∙ �𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 − 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) − 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝)� 
𝑞′ > 𝑞 
(27) 
 
As shown in Equation 27, in order for this deception to be effective (i.e. the de-
ception provides an increase in the value of the game to the deceptive player), the value 
of 𝑞′ in the deceptive game must exceed that of 𝑞 in the true game.  In order to maintain 
believability, only the values in the bottom row of the payoff matrix can be changed.  
These conditions are identical to that of the chosen action case for row-changing, equilib-
rium-destroying deception and will be described in detail in the following section.  How-
ever, even if deception is believable, there exists the possibility that the deceiver will play 
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a strategy outside the equilibrium of the deceptive game, appearing irrational to the mark 
and possibly causing them to question the believability of the game. 
3.3.3.2 Chosen Action 
In the chosen action case of the row-changing equilibrium-destroying method of 
environmental deception, the deceiver selects an action from the equilibrium of the true 
game to play before creating the deceptive game.  The goal of the deceptive game is to 
increase the probability that the mark plays a strategy resulting in a high value cell in the 
deceiver’s chosen row. Due to the structure of the game as described previously, the de-
ceiver should select the top row and attempt to increase the value of q for the mark, in-
creasing the probability of the deceiver receiving the payoff at location a.  The calcula-
tion of q for the original and revised game is shown in Equation 28. 
 𝑞′ > 𝑞 
−𝑏 + ℎ′
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔′ + ℎ′ > −𝑏 + 𝑒𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (28) 
 As shown in Equation 28, the value of q in the revised game (shown as 𝑞’) 
can be affected by the payoffs at locations a, b, g, and h.  In order to achieve believable 
deception, the values at a and b cannot be changed, but g and h can be modified to in-
crease the value of q in the deceptive game.  Ideally modifications to g and h will in-
crease the value of q in the deceptive game and help create the desired equilibrium.  First, 
the increase, s, to g necessary to increase the value of q in the deceptive game are consid-
ered, as shown in Equation 29. 
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 −𝑏 + ℎ
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ > −𝑏 + 𝑒𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ) (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ) − 𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ) > −𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) 
𝑠 > − (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ)
−𝑏 + 𝑒  
𝑠 > − (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) + (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (−𝑏 + ℎ)
−𝑏 + 𝑒  
𝑠 > − (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔)
−𝑏 + 𝑒  
𝑠 > (𝑏 − ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑)
𝑏 − 𝑒
+ (𝑎 − 𝑔) 
(29) 
As shown in Equation 29, increases to the value of g increase the value of q in the 
deceptive game (since a lower bound for s is shown).  The other requirement for effective 
row-changing, equilibrium-destroying environmental deception is that the bottom row of 
the payoff matrix replaces the middle row as part of the equilibrium in the deceptive 
game.  In order to accomplish this, the value of the bottom row must exceed that of the 
middle row given the mark’s probabilities of play for each strategy in the true game.  The 
calculation of the change, s, to the value of g necessary to accomplish this is shown in 
Equation 30. 
 (𝑔 + 𝑠) ∙ 𝑞 + ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞) > 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) 
𝑔 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑠 ∙ 𝑞 > 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) − ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞) 
𝑠 ∙ 𝑞 > (𝑑 − 𝑔) ∙ 𝑞 + (𝑒 − ℎ) ∙ (1 − 𝑞) 
𝑠 > (𝑒 − ℎ) ∙ (1 − 𝑞)
𝑞
+ (𝑑 − 𝑔) 
(30) 
Equation 30 shows that increases to the value of g help to create the desired equi-
librium in the deceptive game in addition to increasing the value of q in the deceptive 
game (since once again a lower bound is provided for the value of s).  A constraint on the 
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maximum amount, s, by which g can be changed is defined by the fact that changing the 
mark’s equilibrium strategies is not desirable.  This provides another bound on the maxi-
mum change to g as shown in Equation 31. 
 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝′ + (𝑔 + 𝑠) ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) < 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑖 ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) 
𝑎 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑔 + 𝑠 − (𝑔 + 𝑠) ∙ 𝑝′ < 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑖 − 𝑖 ∙ 𝑝′ 
𝑝′ ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + 𝑖) < −𝑔 − 𝑠 + 𝑖 
−𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + 𝑖) < −𝑔 − 𝑠 + 𝑖 (−𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + 𝑖) < (−𝑔 − 𝑠 + 𝑖) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ) (−𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ) ∙ (−𝑔 − 𝑠 + 𝑖) + (−𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) < (−𝑔 − 𝑠 + 𝑖) ∙ (−𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ) + (−𝑔 − 𝑠 + 𝑖) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) (−𝑔 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) − 𝑠 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) < (−𝑔 + 𝑖) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) − 𝑠 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) 
𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑐) < (−𝑔 + 𝑖) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) − (−𝑔 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) 
(31) 
Whether Equation 31 provides an upper or another lower bound upon the change, 
s, to g depends on the values of b and c.  Regardless, it provides more information about 
the range of values by which g can be modified in a way useful to the deceiver. 
The value of q in the deceptive game can also be affected by changes in the value 
of the payoff at location h.  The minimum change, t, to the value of h necessary to create 
a value of q in the deceptive that exceeds the value of q in the original game is shown in 
Equation 32. 
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 𝑞′ > 𝑞 
−𝑏 + ℎ + 𝑡
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡 > −𝑏 + 𝑒𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (−𝑏 + ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡) (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) + 𝑡 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ) + 𝑡 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) + (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (−𝑏 + ℎ) + (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) 
𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) − (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) 
𝑡 > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔)
𝑎 − 𝑑
− (−𝑏 + ℎ) 
(32) 
Equation 32 demonstrates that increases to the value of h in the deceptive payoff 
matrix increases the value of q in the deceptive game (since a lower bound for the modi-
fication, t, to the value to h is calculated).  Equation 33 shows the modification, t, to the 
value of h necessary for the desired equilibrium to exist in the deceptive game, the other 
necessary condition for effective row-changing equilibrium-destroying environmental 
deception to occur. 
 𝑔 ∙ 𝑞 + (ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ (1 − 𝑞) > 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) 
ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞) + 𝑡 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) > 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) − 𝑔 ∙ 𝑞 
𝑡 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) > (𝑑 − 𝑔) ∙ 𝑞 + (𝑒 − ℎ) ∙ (1 − 𝑞) 
𝑡 > (𝑑 − 𝑔) ∙ 𝑞(1 − 𝑞) + (𝑒 − ℎ) 
(33) 
As shown in Equation 33, increases to h do help to create the desired equilibrium 
as a minimum value for the increase, t, to the value of h is calculated.  As for the possible 
modifications to the value of g, the possible changes to h are bounded by the fact that 
changes to h may destroy the desired equilibrium of the deceptive game by changing the 
mark’s equilibrium strategy profile.  Equation 34 calculates the bounds on the modifica-
tion, t, to the value of h based upon this property. 
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 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝′ + (ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) < 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑖 ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) 
𝑏 ∙ 𝑝′ + ℎ + 𝑡 − (ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ 𝑝′ < 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑖 − 𝑖 ∙ 𝑝′ 
𝑝′ ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐 − ℎ − 𝑡 + 𝑖) < −ℎ − 𝑡 + 𝑖 
−𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐 − ℎ − 𝑡 + 𝑖) < −ℎ − 𝑡 + 𝑖 (−𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐 − ℎ − 𝑡 + 𝑖) < (−ℎ − 𝑡 + 𝑖) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡) (−𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ (−ℎ − 𝑡 + 𝑖) + (−𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) < (−ℎ − 𝑡 + 𝑖) ∙ (−𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡) + (−ℎ − 𝑡 + 𝑖) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) (−𝑔 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) < (−ℎ + 𝑖) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) − 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) 
𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) < (−ℎ + 𝑖) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) − (−𝑔 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) 
(34) 
Whether Equation 34 provides an upper or another lower bound upon the change, 
t, to the value of h depends on the values of a and c.  Regardless, it provides more infor-
mation about the range of values by which h can be modified in a way useful to the de-
ceiver. 
Since both g and h can both simultaneously work to increase the value of q in the 
deceptive game and create the desired equilibrium in the deceptive game, it would be 
helpful to know how much of an effect an increase in the value of g or h has upon the 
value of the game for the deceiver.  Equation 35 shows the calculation of the value gain 
due to an increase of s to the value of g if the desired equilibrium exists in the deceptive 
game. 
 ∆𝑣𝑔 = 𝑣′ − 𝑣 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑏 ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) − 𝑎 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑏 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) = (𝑞′ − 𝑞) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏)  = (𝑎 − 𝑏) ∙ � −𝑏+ℎ
𝑎−𝑏−𝑔−𝑠+ℎ
−
−𝑏+𝑒
𝑎−𝑏−𝑑+𝑒
�  
= (𝑎 − 𝑏) ∙ (−𝑏+ℎ)∙(𝑎−𝑏−𝑑+𝑒)−(−𝑏+𝑒)∙(𝑎−𝑏−𝑔−𝑠+ℎ)(𝑎−𝑏−𝑔−𝑠+ℎ)∙(𝑎−𝑏−𝑑+𝑒)   = (𝑎 − 𝑏) ∙ (−𝑏+ℎ)∙(−𝑏+𝑒)+(−𝑏+ℎ)∙(𝑎−𝑑)−(−𝑏+𝑒)∙(−𝑏+ℎ)−(−𝑏+𝑒)∙(𝑎−𝑔−𝑠)(𝑎−𝑏−𝑔−𝑠+ℎ)∙(𝑎−𝑏−𝑑+𝑒)   = (𝑎 − 𝑏) ∙ (−𝑏+ℎ)∙(𝑎−𝑑)−(−𝑏+𝑒)∙(𝑎−𝑔−𝑠)(𝑎−𝑏−𝑔−𝑠+ℎ)∙(𝑎−𝑏−𝑑+𝑒)   
(35) 
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Equation 36 calculates the amount by which the value of the game to the deceiver 
is increased when the payoff at location h is increased by an amount t, assuming that the 
desired equilibrium exists in the deceptive game. 
 ∆𝑣ℎ = 𝑣′ − 𝑣 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑏 ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) − 𝑎 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑏 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) = (𝑞′ − 𝑞) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) = (𝑎 − 𝑏) ∙ � −𝑏+ℎ+𝑡
𝑎−𝑏−𝑔+ℎ+𝑡
−
−𝑏+𝑒
𝑎−𝑏−𝑑+𝑒
�  
= (𝑎 − 𝑏) ∙ (−𝑏+ℎ+𝑡)∙(𝑎−𝑏−𝑑+𝑒)−(−𝑏+𝑒)∙(𝑎−𝑏−𝑔+ℎ+𝑡)(𝑎−𝑏−𝑔+ℎ+𝑡)∙(𝑎−𝑏−𝑑+𝑒)   = (𝑎 − 𝑏) ∙ (−𝑏+ℎ+𝑡)∙(−𝑏+𝑒)+(−𝑏+ℎ+𝑡)∙(𝑎−𝑑)−(−𝑏+𝑒)∙(−𝑏+ℎ+𝑡)−(−𝑏+𝑒)∙(𝑎−𝑔)(𝑎−𝑏−𝑔+ℎ+𝑡)∙(𝑎−𝑏−𝑑+𝑒)   = (𝑎 − 𝑏) ∙ (−𝑏+ℎ+𝑡)∙(𝑎−𝑑)−(−𝑏+𝑒)∙(𝑎−𝑔)(𝑎−𝑏−𝑔+ℎ+𝑡)∙(𝑎−𝑏−𝑑+𝑒)   
(36) 
Using the results of Equations 35 and 36, it is now possible to determine whether 
an increase to the value of g or h has a greater effect upon the value of the game.  Equa-
tion 37 shows under which circumstances an increase to g is more effective than an in-
crease to h.  
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 ∆𝑣𝑔 > ∆𝑣ℎ 
(𝑎 − 𝑏) ∙ (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔 − 𝑠)(𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) > (𝑎 − 𝑏) ∙ (−𝑏 + ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔)(𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒)  (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔 − 𝑠)(𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) > (−𝑏 + ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔)(𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒)  
 
�(−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔 − 𝑠)� ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡) > 
�(−𝑏 + ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔)� ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ) 
 
�(−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) + 𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒)� ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡) > 
�(−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) − (𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔)� ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ) 
 (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ) + (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ 𝑡 − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ)
− (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) ∙ 𝑡 + 𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡) > (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ) − (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ 𝑠 + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒)
∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ) ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) ∙ 𝑠 
 (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ 𝑡 − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) ∙ 𝑡 + 𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 + ℎ + 𝑡) > (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ 𝑠 + (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) ∙ 𝑠 + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑔 − 𝑠 + ℎ) 
 (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ 𝑡 − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) ∙ 𝑡 + 𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) + 𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (−𝑏 + ℎ + 𝑡) > (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ 𝑠 + (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔) ∙ 𝑠 + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ (−𝑏 + ℎ) + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔 − 𝑠) 
 (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ �(𝑎 − 𝑔) ∙ 𝑡 + (−𝑏 + ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ 𝑠� > (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ �(−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ 𝑠 + 𝑡 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑔 − 𝑠)� (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ �(𝑎 − 𝑔) ∙ 𝑡 + (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ 𝑠 + 𝑠 ∙ 𝑡� > (𝑎 − 𝑑) ∙ �(𝑎 − 𝑔) ∙ 𝑡 + (−𝑏 + ℎ) ∙ 𝑠 + 𝑠 ∙ 𝑡� (−𝑏 + 𝑒) > (𝑎 − 𝑑) 
(37) 
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As shown in Equation 37, the relative values of the cells b, e, a, and d determine 
whether modifying g or h is more effective to increasing the value of the game to the de-
ceiver.  If �–𝑏 + 𝑒� > (𝑎 − 𝑑), then increases to the value of g are more beneficial to the 
deceiver, otherwise increases to the value of h are more effective.  The other goal of mod-
ifying the values of g and h is to increase the value of the strategy containing them for the 
row player so that it replaces the middle row as part of the equilibrium for the deceptive 
game.  For this purpose, the modification that increases the row’s value more quickly is 
preferable.  Equation 38 shows the ratio of the effectiveness of modifications to g (shown 
as s) and h (shown as t) towards accomplishing this task. 
 (𝑔 + 𝑠) ∙ 𝑞 + ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞) = 𝑔 ∙ 𝑞 + (ℎ + 𝑡) ∙ (1 − 𝑞) 
𝑔 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑠 ∙ 𝑞 + ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞) = 𝑔 ∙ 𝑞 + ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞) + 𝑡 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) 
𝑠 ∙ 𝑞 = 𝑡 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) 
𝑠
𝑡
= 1 − 𝑞
𝑞
 
(38) 
As shown in Equation 38, if q is greater than 1-q, then modifications to h are more 
effective and vice versa.  The circumstances under which q is greater than 1-q are shown 
in Equation 39. 
 𝑞 > 1 − 𝑞 
−𝑏 + 𝑒
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 > 1 − −𝑏 + 𝑒𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 
−𝑏 + 𝑒
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 > 𝑎 − 𝑑𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 
−𝑏 + 𝑒 > 𝑎 − 𝑑 
(39) 
As shown in Equation 39, increasing h is more effective in creating the desired 
equilibrium under the same circumstances that increasing g is more effective in increas-
ing the value of the game to the deceiver.  If sufficient cost is available to create the de-
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sired equilibrium using the method that provides the better value gain, then the deceiver 
should do so if the other bounds on the amount of modification to the cell allow.  Other-
wise, a strategy which involves modifying both g and h to maximize value gain while 
achieving the desired equilibrium may be necessary.  
3.3.3.3 Deceptive Equilibrium 
The third case considered for the row-changing equilibrium-destroying method of 
deception is when the deceiver plays the Nash equilibrium of the deceptive game.  In or-
der for deception to be effective, the value of the game to the deceiver must increase due 
to deception.  In order for deception to be believable, the cells within the equilibrium of 
the deceptive game must remain unchanged, i.e. the cells at locations a, b, g, and h.  A 
necessary condition for the value to increase is shown in Equation 40. 
 𝑣′ > 𝑣 
𝑎 ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑏 ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) > 𝑎 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑏 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) 
𝑎 ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑏 − 𝑏 ∙ 𝑞 > 𝑎 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑏 − 𝑏 ∙ 𝑞 
𝑞′ ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) > 𝑞 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) 
𝑞′ > 𝑞 
(40) 
The final step of Equation 40 is true since the value at location a is greater than 
that at location b due to the structure of the payoff matrix described earlier.  As shown, 
for the value of the game to increase, the value of q must increase in the deceptive game.  
Another necessary condition for the value of the game to increase is shown in Equation 
41. 
50 
 𝑣′ > 𝑣 
𝑔 ∙ 𝑞′ + ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) > 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) > 𝑔 ∙ 𝑞 + ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞) 
𝑔 ∙ 𝑞′ + ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) > 𝑔 ∙ 𝑞 + ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞) 
𝑔 ∙ 𝑞′ + ℎ − ℎ ∙ 𝑞′ > 𝑔 ∙ 𝑞 + ℎ − ℎ ∙ 𝑞 
𝑞′ ∙ (𝑔 − ℎ) > 𝑞 ∙ (𝑔 − ℎ) 
𝑞′ < 𝑞 
(41) 
In Equation 41, the final step is true because g must be less than h given the struc-
ture of the game described previously and the existence of a MSNE in the deceptive 
game.  As shown in Equations 40 and 41, in order to increase the value of the deceptive 
game, the value of q must be both strictly greater than and strictly less than the value of 
the original game.  Since these conditions are mutually incompatible, playing the equilib-
rium of the deceptive game while performing believable row-changing equilibrium-
destroying deception provides no benefit to the deceiver. 
3.3.4 Equilibrium-Destroying Deception (Columns) 
For the scenarios where the game contains a 2x2 MSNE, Equations 42, 43, and 44 
provide information about the value of the game derived from knowledge of the Nash 
equilibrium, using the labeling of cells and probabilities shown in Figure 1.  From Equa-
tion 43, the probabilities of play p and q of the deceiver and mark can be calculated as 
shown in Equations 45 and 46. 
 𝑣 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) ∙ (1 − 𝑞) (42) 
 
 𝑣 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑏 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) = 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑞) = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) = 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) (43) 
 
 𝑔 ∙ 𝑞 + ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑞) < 𝑣 < 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑓 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) (44) 
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 𝑝 = −𝑑 + 𝑒
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (45) 
 
 𝑞 =  −𝑏 + 𝑒
𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (46) 
As the deceptive game contains an equilibrium different from that of the true 
game, Equations 42-46 do not apply.  Equations 47, 48, and 49 show calculations of the 
value of the deceptive game based upon knowledge of the Nash equilibrium. Equations 
50 and 51 are based on Equation 48 and provide the Nash equilibrium probabilities that 
the row and column players play the top row strategy and the leftmost column strategy in 
the deceptive game. 
 𝑣′ = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝′ ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝′ ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) + 𝑑 ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑓 ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) (47) 
 
 𝑣′ = 𝑎′ ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑐′ ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) = 𝑑′ ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑓′ ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) = 𝑎′ ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑑′ ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) = 𝑐′ ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑓′ ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) (48) 
 
 𝑔′ ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑖′ ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) < 𝑣′ < 𝑏′ ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑒′ ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) (49) 
 
 𝑝′ = −𝑑′ + 𝑓′
𝑎′ − 𝑐′ − 𝑑′ + 𝑓′ (50) 
 
 𝑞′ = −𝑐′ + 𝑓′
𝑎′ − 𝑐′ − 𝑑′ + 𝑓′ (51) 
Using the information provided in Equations 42-51, the effectiveness of column-
changing, equilibrium-destroying deception for 2x2 MSNEs can be considered. 
3.3.4.1 True Equilibrium 
The first case considered for the column-changing, equilibrium-destroying meth-
od of environmental deception is when the deceiver plays the Nash equilibrium of the 
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true game.  In order for deception to be beneficial to the deceiver, the value of the game 
to him must increase as a result of deception.  As shown in Equation 47, the value of the 
deceptive game is dependent solely on the values at locations a, c, d, and f.  As these val-
ues are all within the strategies playable by the deceiver at the equilibrium of the true 
game, it is impossible for the deceiver to perform effective, believable deception using 
the column-changing, equilibrium-destroying method if he plays the equilibrium of the 
true game. 
3.3.4.2 Chosen Action 
The second option for the deceiver performing column-changing, equilibrium-
destroying deception is to select a strategy to play before developing a deceptive game to 
present to the mark.  Under these circumstances, as in previous cases, the deceiver is as-
sumed to select the top row strategy and attempts to increase the probability that he re-
ceives the payoff at location a by increasing the value of q in the deceptive game.  In or-
der to maintain believability, the deceiver is limited to modifying values outside of his 
chosen action, i.e. the values of d, e, and f.  As the values of d and f affect the value of q 
in the deceptive game, the effects of changing them are considered.  Equation 52 shows 
the effect of changing the value of d by an amount s upon the value of q in the deceptive 
game. 
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 𝑞′ > 𝑞 
−𝑐 + 𝑓
𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓 > −𝑏 + 𝑒𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (−𝑐 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) (−𝑐 + 𝑓) ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) + (−𝑐 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (−𝑐 + 𝑓) + (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑 − 𝑠) (−𝑐 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) − 𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) (−𝑐 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) − (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) > −𝑠 ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) 
𝑠 > (𝑎 − 𝑑) − (−𝑐 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑)
−𝑏 + 𝑒  
(52) 
As shown in Equation 52, increasing the value of d increases the value of q in the 
deceptive game (since a lower bound on s is calculated).  In addition to having an in-
creased value of q, the deceptive game must contain the desired equilibrium, where the 
mark plays a different strategy profile than the true game.  The existence of the equilibri-
um in the deceptive game depends on the rightmost column replacing the center column 
as part of the equilibrium.  The change, s, to d necessary to accomplish this is shown in 
Equation 53. 
 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) > 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑓 ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) 
𝑏 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑒 − 𝑒 ∙ 𝑝′ > 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑓 − 𝑓 ∙ 𝑝′ 
𝑝′ ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 𝑓) > −𝑒 + 𝑓 
−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓
𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓 ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 𝑓) > −𝑒 + 𝑓 (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 𝑓) > (−𝑒 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) + (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) ∙ (−𝑒 + 𝑓) > (−𝑒 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) + (−𝑒 + 𝑓) ∙ (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) (−𝑑 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) − 𝑠 ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) > (−𝑒 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) 
−𝑠 ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) > (−𝑒 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) − (−𝑑 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) 
𝑠 ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) < −(−𝑒 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) + (−𝑑 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑏 − 𝑐) 
(53) 
As shown in Equation 53, increasing the value of d does help to create the desired 
equilibrium while achieving a higher value of the game to the deceiver under certain cir-
54 
cumstances.  However, other constraints do apply.  The value of d cannot exceed the val-
ue of e or the row of the equilibrium will change instead of the column, therefore 
𝑑 + 𝑠 < 𝑒.  Another constraint on the increase, s, to the value of d is that the leftmost 
column strategy must have a lower value than the other two row strategies in the new 
equilibrium.  The computation of this constraint is shown in Equation 54. 
 𝑎 ∙ 𝑝′ + (𝑑 + 𝑠) ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) < 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝′ + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝′) 
𝑎 ∙ 𝑝′ + (𝑑 + 𝑠) − (𝑑 + 𝑠) ∙ 𝑝′ < 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑒 − 𝑒 ∙ 𝑝′ 
𝑝′ ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) < −𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒 
−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓
𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) < −𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒 (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) < (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) 
 (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) + (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) ∙ (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒)< (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) + (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑓) 
 (−𝑑 − 𝑠) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) + 𝑓 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) < (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) 
−(𝑑 + 𝑠) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) < (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) − 𝑓 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) (𝑑 + 𝑠) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) > −(−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) + 𝑓 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) 
(𝑑 + 𝑠) > − (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐)
𝑎 − 𝑏
+ 𝑓 
𝑒 > − (−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐)
𝑎 − 𝑏
+ 𝑓 (𝑒 − 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) > −(−𝑑 − 𝑠 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) (𝑒 − 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) > −(−𝑑 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) + 𝑠 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) (𝑒 − 𝑓) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏) + (−𝑑 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) > 𝑠 ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐) 
(54) 
As shown in Equation 54, additional constrains upon the increase, s, to the value 
of d exist; however, under some circumstances increases to the value of d also help to 
create the desired equilibrium.  The other value that can be changed to affect the value of 
q in the deceptive game is the value at location f of the payoff matrix.  The effect of 
55 
changing the value of f by an amount t upon the value of q in the deceptive game is 
shown in Equation 55. 
 𝑞′ > 𝑞 
−𝑐 + 𝑓 + 𝑡
𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 + 𝑓 + 𝑡 > −𝑏 + 𝑒𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒 (−𝑐 + 𝑓 + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑏 − 𝑑 + 𝑒) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 + 𝑓 + 𝑡) (−𝑐 + 𝑓 + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) + (−𝑐 + 𝑓 + 𝑡) ∙ (−𝑏 + 𝑒) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) + (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (−𝑐 + 𝑓 + 𝑡) (−𝑐 + 𝑓 + 𝑡) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) > (−𝑏 + 𝑒) ∙ (𝑎 − 𝑑) 
−𝑐 + 𝑓 + 𝑡 > −𝑏 + 𝑒 
𝑡 > −𝑏 + 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 𝑓 
(55) 
As shown in Equation 55, increasing the value of f also increases the value of q in 
the deceptive game (as a lower bound on the value of t is calculated).  The other neces-
sary condition for the deceptive game is for the desired equilibrium in the deceptive game 
to exist.  The value of f has an effect upon the location of the equilibrium, as described in 
Equation 56, where t is the amount by which the value of f is increased. 
 𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) > 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝 + (𝑓 + 𝑡) ∙ (1 − 𝑝) 
𝑏 ∙ 𝑝 + 𝑒 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) − 𝑐 ∙ 𝑝 > 𝑓 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) + 𝑡 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) (𝑏 − 𝑐) ∙ 𝑝 + (𝑒 − 𝑓) ∙ (1 − 𝑝) > 𝑡 ∙ (1 − 𝑝) 
𝑡 < (𝑏 − 𝑐) ∙ 𝑝1 − 𝑝 + (𝑒 − 𝑓) 
(56) 
As shown in Equation 56, increasing the value of f has an adverse effect upon the 
creation of the desired equilibrium in the deceptive game.  Therefore, increasing d is bet-
ter as it works toward both of the deceiver’s goals under some circumstances. 
3.3.4.3 Deceptive Equilibrium 
The third case considered for column-changing, equilibrium-destroying deception 
is if the deceiver chooses to play the Nash equilibrium of the deceptive game.  In order 
for the deception to be both believable and worthwhile to the deceiver, the value of the 
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game must increase due to deception without changing the values of any of the cells con-
tained within the strategies that the deceiver may play.  Equation 48 shows that the value 
of the deceptive game is based upon the cells within the equilibrium of the deceptive 
game.  If the deceiver plays the equilibrium of the deceptive game, it is impossible to in-
crease the value of the game while performing believable deception using the method of 
column-changing, equilibrium-destroying environmental deception. 
  
57 
4. Results 
In Chapter 3, four methods of performing deception were described.  The first, the 
naïve algorithm, applies to any size game with any size or type of equilibrium and works 
by creating a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the deceptive game at a location with 
value greater than the true game’s value.  The remaining three algorithms work on 3x3 
games containing a 2x2 mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE).  The goal of these 
algorithms is to perform deception within the equilibrium of the deceptive game while 
retaining the original equilibrium strategy set, changing the row player’s equilibrium 
strategy set, or changing the column player’s equilibrium strategy set. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that believable, effective deception is only possible for 
the equilibrium-preserving and equilibrium-destroying algorithms if the deceiver selects 
an action to play before creating the deceptive game.  This allows for deception in the 
equilibrium and focuses deceptive efforts toward a specific goal: increasing the probabil-
ity that a high-value cell (from the perspective of the deceiver) is the result of gameplay. 
The goal of this chapter is to empirically demonstrate the correctness of the 
closed-form solutions for equilibrium deception described in the previous chapter and 
compare the four methods of deception based upon the criteria for deception described in 
Chapter 3.  In the first half of this chapter, deception will be applied to three 3x3 games 
containing a 2x2 MSNE.  Multiple games were generated to test the algorithms described 
in Chapter 3, and the three selected games were chosen as they are representative of the 
set of possible games and demonstrate differing relative values of cells while retaining 
the desired features of a 2x2 MSNE within a 3x3 game. 
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For each game, each form of equilibrium deception will be considered separately 
to demonstrate that the closed-form solutions for deception described in Chapter 3 accu-
rately reflect the behavior of the game when deception is applied.  Then, the performance 
of all four algorithms for the game will be compared.  The remainder of the chapter com-
pares the four algorithms based upon the criteria for deception described in Chapter 3. 
4.1 Performance of Algorithms for 3x3 Games with 2x2 MSNE 
The first game considered is the one shown in Figure 2.  This game has a 2x2 
MSNE containing the top and middle rows for the row player and the left and center col-
umns for the column player.  The probabilities of play at equilibrium for each strategy 
(rounded to the nearest percent) are shown above and to the left of the payoff matrix. 
 
Figure 2. Test Game 1. 
The results of applying equilibrium-preserving deception to the game shown in 
Figure 2 are shown in Figure 3.  The figure shows the anticipated value of the game using 
a chosen-action deception and the true value of the game using a chosen-action decep-
tion.  The plateauing of the value indicates that the equilibrium would be broken by fur-
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ther increases to the selected value and/or the selected value has reached its maximum 
value of one. 
In the figure, the anticipated value of the game when the value of d is increased 
(shown as blue dots) assumes that d is increased by the given deceptive cost and is calcu-
lated by Equation 57, where 𝑞′ is the probability that the mark plays the leftmost column 
based upon the Nash equilibrium of the deceptive game as calculated using the equations 
presented in Chapter 3. 
 𝑣 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑏 ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) 
𝑣 = .75 ∙ 𝑞′ + .5 ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) (57) 
The true value of the game when d is increased (shown as green circles) is calcu-
lated using Equation 57 as well, but computing the true value of q for the deceptive game 
rather than the anticipated value based upon the equations presented in Chapter 3.  The 
anticipated and true values of the game when e is increased (red x’s and black +’s respec-
tively) are computed identically to those for the games with increases to d.  If the equa-
tions presented in Chapter 3 are correct, the values of the game computed by both meth-
ods will be identical. 
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Figure 3. Equilibrium-Preserving Deception Results for Test Game 1. 
As shown in Figure 3, equilibrium-preserving deception provides immediate in-
creases in value to the deceiver.  The anticipated and true values of the game using the 
chosen-action deception are identical, indicating that the closed-form solutions for decep-
tion presented in Chapter 3 are correct for this case.  For the game shown in Figure 2, 
increases to the value of e provide better results to the deceiver than increases to the value 
of d.  In practice, modifications to both d and e simultaneously should be used to maxim-
ize the value gain to the deceiver, but separating the possible changes in this context 
demonstrates the correctness of the equations in Chapter 3 for this case and the relative 
effectiveness of increasing d or e. 
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Figure 4. Row-Changing Deception Results for Test Game 1. 
Figure 4 shows the results of applying row-changing, equilibrium-destroying de-
ception to the game shown in Figure 2.  The anticipated values of the game given in-
creases to the values of g and h (blue dots and red x’s respectively) are also computed 
using Equation 57 and the value of 𝑞′ calculated from the equations in Chapter 3.  The 
true values of the game given increases to g and h (green circles and black +’s) are also 
computed using Equation 57 using the true value of 𝑞′ for the deceptive game and should 
be identical to the anticipated value of the game. 
As expected, the row-changing deception does not provide immediate benefit to 
the deceiver since some cost must be applied in order to change the equilibrium of the 
deceptive game before the applied cost affects the value of the game.  As shown, for the 
game in Figure 2, increases to the value of h provide more benefit to the deceiver than 
increases to the value of g. 
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Figure 5. Column-Changing Deception Results for Test Game 1. 
Figure 5 shows the results of performing column-changing, equilibrium-
destroying deception on the game shown in Figure 2.  The anticipated values of the game 
given changes to d and f (blue dots and red x’s respectively) are calculated using Equa-
tion 57 and the value of 𝑞′ determined based upon the equations in Chapter 3.  The true 
values of the game given changes to d and f (green circles and black +’s) are calculated 
using Equation 57 and the true equilibrium probabilities of play for the mark in the de-
ceptive game.  As shown, this game does not fulfill the necessary constraints for an in-
crease to d to change the equilibrium of the deceptive game, so no benefit is derived from 
deception under these circumstances.  Column-changing deception could occur if the val-
ue of e was increased to create the desired deceptive equilibrium; however, the value of e 
has no effect upon the value of the game once the desired equilibrium is produced and the 
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result would be equivalent to performing equilibrium-preserving deception with a differ-
ent initial game, equilibrium location, and maximum deceptive cost. 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of Deception Results for Test Game 1. 
Figure 6 displays the comparative performance of the algorithms applied to the 
game shown in Figure 2.  As expected, the equilibrium-preserving algorithms modifying 
d and e provided benefits to the deceiver immediately, while the remaining algorithms 
have some delay.  The naïve algorithm performed the best as cost increased.  In this case, 
the naïve algorithm had sufficient deceptive cost available to it to increase the value of 
the deceptive game to the evader to the maximum value of the payoff matrix in the true 
game.   
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
Deceptive Cost
V
al
ue
 
 
Naive Algorithm
Equilibrium Preserving (d)
Equilibrium Preserving (e)
Row Changing (g)
Row Changing (h)
Column Changing (d)
Column Changing (f)
64 
  
Figure 7. Test Game 2. 
The second game considered is shown in Figure 7.  The probabilities of play at 
equilibrium for each strategy (rounded to the nearest percent) are shown above and to the 
left of the payoff matrix.  The game contains a 2x2 MSNE at the same location as the 
game shown in Figure 2.  However, the relative values of c and f and g and h are reversed 
for this game. 
 
Figure 8. Equilibrium-Preserving Deception Results for Test Game 2. 
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Figure 8 shows the results of applying equilibrium-preserving deception to the 
game shown in Figure 7.  The value of the game for each case is calculated using Equa-
tion 58, with a value of 𝑞′ derived from the equations in Chapter 3 or the true value in the 
deceptive game.   
 𝑣 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑏 ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) 
𝑣 = .91 ∙ 𝑞′ + .13 ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) (58) 
Like the equilibrium-preserving case for the first game, the anticipated value is 
correct for the changes to the values of d and e in the payoff matrix.  Unlike the first case, 
the modifications to the value of d outperform the modifications to the value of e for this 
game. 
 
Figure 9. Row-Changing Deception Results for Test Game 2. 
Figure 9 shows the results of performing row-changing environmental deception 
upon the value of the game shown in Figure 7.  The value of the game for each case is 
calculated using Equation 58 and the values of 𝑞′ computed as described previously.  
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Like the first game, changing the value of h was more effective than changing the value 
of g.  As shown, the value of the game remains constant until h is changed sufficiently to 
create the desired equilibrium, causing a rapid increase in the value of the game to the 
deceiver. 
 
Figure 10. Column-Changing Deception Results for Test Game 2. 
Figure 10 shows the results of performing column-changing, equilibrium-
destroying deception on the game in Figure 7.  The anticipated and true values of the 
game for increases to the value of d and f are computed using Equation 58 as described 
previously.  As for the results for the first game, the necessary conditions for the increase 
to d to create the desired equilibrium are not fulfilled for this game.   
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Figure 11. Comparison of Deception Results for Test Game 2. 
Figure 11 shows the results of the four algorithms when used to generate decep-
tive strategies for the game shown in Figure 7.  This graph is similar to that of the previ-
ous game overall, but is interesting in how the performance of the naïve algorithm does 
not have as clear of a lead over the other algorithms as in the previous case.  In this 
graph, the naïve algorithm only outperforms the equilibrium preserving algorithm after 
applying over 0.7 units of cost.  This is caused by the great difference in value between 
the high and low values within the MSNE of the payoff matrix. 
Also interesting is the fact that the naïve algorithm never reached the value of the 
maximum value in the payoff matrix in this case.  This indicates that the algorithm has 
insufficient deceptive cost available to do so and deception is costly to the deceiver using 
this algorithm.  However, modifications to the value of d provide instant benefit to the 
deceiver and continue to do so until the boundary condition is reached. 
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Figure 12. Test Game 3. 
Figure 12 shows the third game to which the strategies for deception are applied.  
The probabilities of play at equilibrium for each strategy (rounded to the nearest percent) 
are shown above and to the left of the payoff matrix.  In this game, the relative values of 
the cells at locations e and h are reversed.  The game contains a 2x2 MSNE at the same 
location as the previous two games. 
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Figure 13. Equilibrium-Preserving Deception Results for Test Game 3 
Figure 13 shows the results of applying the equilibrium-preserving deception al-
gorithm to the game shown in Figure 12.  The anticipated and true values of the game are 
calculated using the computation of 𝑞′ as described previously and Equation 59. 
 𝑣 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑞′ + 𝑏 ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) 
𝑣 = .97 ∙ 𝑞′ + .49 ∙ (1 − 𝑞′) (59) 
As shown, both sets of anticipated game values match the truth, demonstrating the 
correctness of the equations described in Chapter 3 for this case. 
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Figure 14. Row-Changing Deception Results for Test Game 3. 
Figure 14 shows the results of applying row-changing, equilibrium-destroying de-
ception to the game shown in Figure 12.  The anticipated and true values of the game for 
all cases were computed using Equation 59 and the computation of 𝑞′ as described for the 
previous two games.  In this game, row-changing, equilibrium-destroying deception 
could not be performed as g is greater than h in the initial game (which makes the desired 
MSNE impossible if g is further increased) and no value for h exists that does not violate 
at least one of the boundary conditions for h. 
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Figure 15. Column-Changing Deception Results for Test Game 3. 
Figure 15 shows the results of performing column-changing, equilibrium-
destroying deception on the game shown in Figure 12.  The value of the game for each 
case is calculated as described previously using Equation 59.  As shown, unlike the pre-
vious two games the necessary conditions for creating the equilibrium by increasing the 
value of d are fulfilled in this case, allowing the column-changing equilibrium-destroying 
algorithm to perform effective deception if the value of d is increased. 
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Figure 16. Comparison of Deception Results for Test Game 3. 
Finally, Figure 16 demonstrates the performance of the four deceptive algorithms 
described in Chapter 3 when applied to the game shown in Figure 12.  This graph is simi-
lar to that of the first game, with the naïve algorithm only narrowly outperforming the 
equilibrium-preserving algorithm and at significant cost.  Unlike the first and second 
games, the column-changing equilibrium-destroying deception algorithm does provide 
positive results, but is outperformed by both the naïve and equilibrium-preserving algo-
rithms.  Once again, the naïve algorithm does not reach the highest value of the payoff 
matrix due to cost constraints. 
This section demonstrates the effectiveness of the four algorithms described in 
Chapter 3 for developing strategies for environmental deception.  Three 3x3 games con-
taining a 2x2 MSNE with differing relative cell values were considered and the correct-
ness of the closed-form solutions for deception were empirically validated for each.  Each 
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method of deception and means for creating the desired deceptive equilibrium is consid-
ered separately in this section to highlight their relative strengths and weaknesses, but 
combinations of multiple types are possible if cost is available.  The effectiveness of each 
algorithm with regard to value gain and deceptive cost varies based upon the structure of 
the game.  The next section compares the four algorithms based upon the remaining four 
criteria for effective deception: benefit delay, believability, opponent risk, and efficiency. 
4.2 Comparative Performance of Algorithms With Regard to Criteria 
In Chapter 3, six criteria for evaluating the performance of the environmental de-
ception algorithms were presented.  These criteria are the value gain achieved by decep-
tion, the deceptive cost incurred, the delay in benefits to the deceiver due to deception, 
the believability of the deception, the opponent risk of deception, and the efficiency of 
the algorithm. 
The relative effectiveness of the algorithms with regard to value gain and decep-
tive cost are shown in the previous section for various games.  As discussed previously, 
the effectiveness of an algorithm is dependent upon the type of games to which it is ap-
plied. 
The benefit delay of an algorithm does not depend upon the type of game to 
which the algorithm is applied.  The only algorithm presented here with no benefit delay 
is the equilibrium-preserving algorithm, as the application of deceptive cost produces an 
instant value gain to the deceiver.  The naïve, row-changing, and column-changing algo-
rithms all have a benefit delay as some cost is necessary to help create the desired equi-
74 
librium within the deceptive game before the deceptive player receives an increase in the 
value of the game due to deception. 
The believability of a deceptive algorithm is independent of the type of game to 
which an algorithm for developing deceptive strategies is applied.  Each algorithm is la-
beled here as having high, medium, or low believability.   
A highly believable algorithm never produces a deceptive strategy in which the 
mark can receive a payoff value that has been changed in the deceptive game.  The equi-
librium deception algorithms have high believability as the deceiver selects a strategy to 
play in advance and does not modify the values of any of the payoff cells contained with-
in that strategy.   
An algorithm with medium believability does not produce deceptive strategies 
where a rational, deceived mark (i.e. one playing a strategy derived from the Nash equi-
librium of the deceptive game) will not receive a payoff that has been modified in the 
deceptive game.  However, a mark that does not play rationally may receive a payoff that 
has been modified.  The naïve algorithm falls into this category as it creates a PSNE 
within the game and does not modify that value of the PSNE cell.  However, cells in the 
row of the PSNE may be modified, so an irrational or suspicious mark may receive a 
payoff that has been modified in the deceptive game. 
An algorithm with low believability produces deceptive strategies where a mark 
can receive payoffs that have been modified in the deceptive game even if he plays at the 
Nash equilibrium of the deceptive game.  None of the algorithms presented here fall into 
this category. 
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Opponent risk measures the amount of risk to the deceiver caused by a mark that 
is irrational or suspicious.  The deceptive strategies generated by the algorithms described 
previously assume that the mark is deceived and plays at a strategy derived from the 
Nash equilibrium of the deceptive game.  However, the loss of value gain and believabil-
ity caused by violation of this assumption varies from algorithm to algorithm and is 
measured by opponent risk.  Each algorithm for generating deceptive strategies classified 
as having high or low opponent risk.   
A high value of opponent risk indicates that a deceptive strategy is highly de-
pendent upon the mark playing the equilibrium strategy of the deceptive game, as is the 
case for the naïve algorithm.  In this algorithm, the deceiver forces a PSNE in the decep-
tive game regardless of the type or location of the equilibrium of the true game.  This 
blind approach to deception is highly dependent upon the mark’s cooperation and thus 
has high opponent risk. 
A deceptive strategy has low opponent risk if the deceptive player plays in a way 
that is rational for the true game.  This is true of the equilibrium deception algorithms.  
For all of these algorithms, the deceiver selects a strategy within the equilibrium of the 
true game to play.  If the mark is not deceived and plays the equilibrium of the true game, 
these deceptive strategies do not cause a loss for the deceiver. 
Finally, the efficiency of the algorithm is important to the determination of decep-
tive strategies.  If an algorithm cannot determine a deceptive strategy within the time al-
lotted to it, the effectiveness of the resulting strategy is immaterial.  The efficiencies of 
the deceptive strategy generation algorithms are measured as high, medium, and low. 
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An algorithm with high efficiency has efficiency on the order of 𝑂(1).  This is 
true for the equilibrium deception algorithms as the number of calculations necessary to 
determine the best deception is based simply off maximizing the increase to a value while 
not violating the boundary conditions or cost threshold. 
The naïve algorithm has medium efficiency as the majority of the means for de-
veloping a deceptive strategy is determined in advance.  Once a cell is selected to be the 
PSNE cell of the modified game, the desired modified game can be created in time on the 
order of 𝑂(𝑚) where 𝑚 is the number of cells within the payoff matrix of the game. 
No algorithms presented here have efficiency worse than linear in the size of the 
game or the cost of deception. 
In selecting a method of deception to perform, tradeoffs must be made.  Based 
upon believability, opponent risk, and efficiency, the three equilibrium deception algo-
rithms appear equal and outperform the naïve algorithm.  However, the equilibrium de-
ception algorithms are currently limited to 2x2 MSNEs within a 3x3 game, while the na-
ive algorithm can operate on any game.   
As shown in this and the previous section, the three equilibrium deception algo-
rithms are not equal with regard to effectiveness per unit expended cost.  The equilibri-
um-destroying algorithms require an input of deceptive cost to create the desired equilib-
rium before any benefit comes to the deceiver.  If the deceiver has a maximum allowable 
deceptive cost less than the amount necessary to create the equilibrium, then equilibrium-
destroying deception is useless to him.   
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The effectiveness of a method for environmental deception is very much depend-
ent upon the game to which it is applied and the selection should take into account the 
tradeoffs described in this section and the results presented earlier in the chapter for 
games with different relative values of cells with the same equilibrium structure. 
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5.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
The study of performing and defending against deception is a field of great inter-
est in game theory; however, the focus of research is primarily on action deception and 
extensive-form games.  The goal of this research is to develop methods to generate strat-
egies for performing environmental deception in strategic-form games, where the decep-
tion centers upon the mark’s perception of the game being played rather than the actions 
taken by the deceiver.   
To this end, four algorithms were developed using different methods for generat-
ing strategies for modifying the mark’s perception of the payoff matrix in order to induce 
him to play using a suboptimal strategy and increase the value of the game for the de-
ceiver.  These algorithms are the naïve, equilibrium preserving, row-changing equilibri-
um-destroying and column-changing equilibrium-destroying algorithms.  The naïve algo-
rithm is applicable to all sizes of games containing all types of Nash equilibria, while the 
current versions of the remaining algorithms are only capable of generating deceptive 
strategies for 3x3 games containing 2x2 MSNEs. 
The algorithms were applied a set of 3x3 games  containing a 2x2 MSNE where 
the payoff values for the deceiver and mark in a cell of the payoff matrix sum to one.  
The algorithms are evaluated based upon the  
1. Increase in value of the game for the deceiver due to the deception,  
2. The cost of deception,  
3. The believability of the deception,  
4. The risk related to deception if the attacker does not play at the Nash equilibrium 
of the deceptive game due to irrationality or suspicion 
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5. The efficiency of the algorithm.   
Based upon these results, it is found that the value gain produced by a deceptive 
algorithm is dependent upon the type of game to which it is applied and the maximum 
amount of allowable change to the payoff matrix emphasizing the importance of carefully 
selecting an algorithm to match the situation to which it is applied.  The naïve algorithm 
is applicable to all games but risks discovery of deception and has efficiency linear in the 
size of the payoff matrix.  The remaining three algorithms are only applicable to games 
containing 2x2 MSNEs in 3x3 games and have high believability and high efficiency, but 
cannot achieve the same maximum value gain to the deceiver as the naïve algorithm if 
sufficient cost is available to the deceiver. 
The major contributions of this research are an expansion of the notion of equilib-
rium stability as described in [3] to include cells outside of the equilibrium of a game, the 
definition of a set of criteria to evaluate strategies for environmental deception, the crea-
tion of an algorithm that performs effective environmental deception on any game with 
minimal information (for use as a baseline for evaluation of other environmental decep-
tion algorithms), and the development of closed-form solutions for calculating deceptive 
strategies that transform a 3x3 game containing a 2x2 MSNE into a deceptive game con-
taining a 2x2 MSNE where equilibrium play by the mark in the deceptive game provides 
an increase in value of the game to the deceiver. 
Several areas of further research exist based upon the work described in this the-
sis.  This work demonstrates that closed-form solutions for effective, believable environ-
mental deception can be determined for a 2x2 MSNE within a 3x3 game.  The first two 
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areas of future work are the expansion of these closed-form solutions to include different 
types of equilibria within a 3x3 game.   
Based upon the stability analysis described earlier, the minimum amount of 
change to a game containing a PSNE can be easily calculated, resulting in a MSNE to 
which the current closed-form solutions can be applied.  However, there is no guarantee 
that the lowest cost transformation produces the MSNE for which the deceiver can apply 
the methods described here to achieve the greatest value gain for minimum cost.  Explo-
ration of the transformation of PSNEs in the true game to MSNEs in the deceptive game 
is a promising area of future research. 
Secondly, while the research described here describes methods for deception in 
3x3 games containing 2x2 MSNE, the case of a 3x3 MSNE within a 3x3 game has not 
been solved.  Equilibrium-preserving deception can be performed simply by generalizing 
the current equations, but the optimal selection of cells to modify has not yet been deter-
mined.   The determination of a closed-form solution for effective equilibrium-destroying 
deception that transforms a 3x3 MSNE to a desired 2x2 MSNE while benefitting the de-
ceiver is also an area open for future study. 
Finally, the expansion of the research to games larger than 3x3 is an area for fu-
ture work.  Deception for larger games containing 2x2 MSNEs is definitely possible and 
increasing the sizes and types of the equilibria as described previously will allow envi-
ronmental for deception in a much larger variety of games. 
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Appendix A. Properties of Non-Cooperative Sum-To-One Games 
The type of games studied in this research- non-cooperative, strategic-form games 
whose payoffs sum to one- have properties that are of interest when developing strategies 
for effective environmental deception.  These properties include the properties of pure-
strategy Nash equilibria in such games and the existence of only a single PSNE or MSNE 
in a game.  This Appendix explains these properties and provides proofs of their accura-
cy. 
A.1 Properties of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Sum-To-One Games 
Pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNEs) are the rarer of the two equilibrium types 
in competitive games due to the conditions necessary for their existence.  For a PSNE to 
exist in a game, there must exist a strategy that provides a payoff better for both players 
given their opponent’s choice of strategy.  For these conditions to exist, the following 
properties of pure-strategy Nash equilibria must be true. 
1. All equilibrium cells have the minimum payoff value in their row from the 
perspective of the row player (from the perspective of the column player, this 
is the maximum in the row and therefore the player has no incentive to deviate 
from this strategy) 
2. All equilibrium cells must have the maximum payoff value in their column 
from the perspective of the row player (the row player must have no incentive 
to deviate from the equilibrium strategy) 
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3. If multiple PSNEs exist in a game, they all have the same payoff value from 
the perspective of both players (based on von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem 
[30]) 
4. Any cell at the intersection of the row of one PSNE and the column of another 
PSNE is also a PSNE with the same value (based on von Neumann’s Minimax 
Theorem [30]) 
The first and second properties are based upon the definition of a Nash equilibri-
um which states that neither player has incentive to unilaterally deviate from the equilib-
rium strategy.  The third and fourth properties are based upon the proof that only a single 
equilibrium can exist in a game, though it may contain multiple cells, and the definition 
of incentive to deviate.  When another cell provides an equal value to a player, there is no 
incentive to change to that cell as it provides no additional value; however, there is no 
cost to the player if they do so.  This definition of incentive to deviate is important to the 
proof in the following section. 
A.2 Existence of a Single Equilibrium in Sum-To-One Games 
In games where the payoffs in a cell of the payoff matrix do not have a constant 
sum, multiple equilibria can exist within a game.  However, in non-cooperative, constant-
sum games, only a single equilibrium can exist in a game.  This section provides proofs 
that two pure-strategy Nash equilibria cannot coexist and that a pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium cannot coexist with a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
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Figure 17. Example 3x3 Game. 
For the proof against the co-existence of two PSNEs, the properties of PSNEs and 
the definition of incentive discussed in the previous section are important.  For this proof, 
inequalities regarding the relative values of equilibrium cells to other cells are assumed to 
be strict.  Once the proof is completed, the effects of allowing equality between values of 
the equilibrium cells and non-equilibrium cells are discussed.  The goal is to provide a 
proof by contradiction of the existence of two equilibrium cells with unequal value in 
cells a and i of the payoff matrix as shown in Figure 17.  Payoffs used are from the per-
spective of the row player. 
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1. 𝑎 > 𝑑  From existence of a PSNE at a 
2. 𝑎 > 𝑔  From existence of a PSNE at a 
3. 𝑎 < 𝑏  From existence of a PSNE at a 
4. 𝑎 < 𝑐  From existence of a PSNE at a 
5. 𝑖 > 𝑐  From existence of a PSNE at i 
6. 𝑖 > 𝑓  From existence of a PSNE at i 
7. 𝑖 < ℎ  From existence of a PSNE at i 
8. 𝑖 < 𝑔  From existence of a PSNE at i 
9. 𝑎 > 𝑖  From 2 and 8 
10. 𝑎 < 𝑖  From 4 and 5 
As 9 and 10 are mutually contradictory, PSNEs with unique values cannot exist at 
a and i.  This proof is based upon von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem [30].  Allowing 
non-strict inequalities results in the following relationships based upon 2, 8, 4, and 5: 
𝑎 ≥ 𝑔 ≥ 𝑖 and 𝑎 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑖.  If a and i are both PSNEs with the same value, c and g must 
also be PSNEs with the same value.  This case is accounted for in the stability analysis in 
Appendix B. 
The proof that a PSNE and an MSNE cannot coexist is also a proof by contradic-
tion.  By definition, an MSNE contains all strategies that provide equivalent value with 
the given equilibrium strategy profiles for both players.  Therefore, any strategy not with-
in the equilibrium must have a value strictly less than the value of the game with the giv-
en probabilities of play of the equilibrium strategies.  Once again, the payoff values in 
Figure 17 are used from the perspective of the row player.  The row player is assumed to 
play the top row with probability 𝑝 and the middle row with probability (1 − 𝑝).  The 
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column player plays the leftmost column with probability 𝑞 and the middle column with 
probability (1 − 𝑞).  A PSNE is assumed to exist at location i. 
1. 𝑣 = 𝑎𝑞 + 𝑏(1 − 𝑞) = 𝑑𝑞 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑞) 
2. 𝑣 > 𝑔𝑞 + ℎ(1 − 𝑞) 
3. 1 − 𝑣 = (1 − 𝑎)𝑝 + (1 − 𝑑)(1 − 𝑝) = (1 − 𝑏)𝑝 + (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑝) 
4. 1 − 𝑣 > (1 − 𝑐)𝑝 + (1 − 𝑓)(1 − 𝑝) = 1 − (𝑐𝑝 + (1 − 𝑓)𝑝) 
5. 𝑣 < 𝑐𝑝 + (1 − 𝑓)(1 − 𝑝) 
6. 𝑖 > 𝑐 
7. 𝑖 > 𝑓 
8. 𝑖 < 𝑔 
9. 𝑖 < ℎ 
10. 𝑣 > 𝑖𝑞 + 𝑖(1 − 𝑞) = 𝑖 
11. 𝑣 < 𝑖𝑝 + (1 − 𝑖)(1 − 𝑝) = 𝑖 
As 10 and 11 are mutually contradictory, a PSNE and a MSNE cannot coexist in a 
game where the payoffs for both players within a cell of the payoff matrix sum to one.  
This proof is also based upon von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem [30].  Between this 
proof and the previous, it is shown that only a single equilibrium exists within a constant-
sum game.  
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Appendix B. Stability of Two-Player Zero-Sum Games 
The stability of a cell in the payoff matrix of a game reflects its ability to change 
the value and/or equilibrium strategy set of a game.  The stability of a cell is used here to 
refer to the minimum value by which a cell can be modified and cause the equilibrium of 
the game to change in value or strategy profile.  This information is useful as it provides 
targeting information for modifications to the payoff matrix presented to the mark when 
environmental deception is being performed.  The stability of a cell is dependent upon the 
type of Nash equilibrium contained within the game, pure-strategy or mixed-strategy, so 
the two cases are discussed separately in this Appendix. 
B.1 Stability of Games Containing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria 
The first case for stability analysis of a game is games containing pure-strategy 
Nash equilibria.  In this section, the game is broken into four regions and each is analyzed 
separately.  The four regions considered are the equilibrium cell(s) of the game, cells in 
the row(s) of the game’s equilibrium cell(s), cells in the column(s) of the game’s equilib-
rium cell(s), and cells that share neither a row nor a column with an equilibrium cell. 
B.1.1 Stability of Equilibrium Cells 
If only one PSNE cell exists, changing the value of the payoff at the equilibrium 
location will change the value of the game since the value of the game for a player is that 
player’s payoff at this location (unless it is changed enough to cause a new equilibrium to 
be formed).  If the equilibrium remains at the original location, then the modified game is 
strategy-equivalent to the original game but not value-equivalent.  In the event that the 
modification to the payoff value of the equilibrium cell causes it to be no longer an equi-
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librium, the game is no longer strategy-equivalent to the original game, (but may be val-
ue-equivalent if the new equilibrium happens to have the same value as the original equi-
librium).  In either case, the value at the equilibrium location (when only one equilibrium 
cell exists) cannot be modified without altering the strategy-equivalence, value-
equivalence, or both.  
If multiple PSNE cells with the same value exist, then the effect of modifying a 
single one of these cells depends upon the number and locations of the equilibrium cells.  
The effects of modifications based upon the direction of modification (increase/decrease) 
and the number and location of equilibrium cells is summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3. Value and Strategy Stability of Games Containing Multi-Cell PSNEs 
Equilibrium Size and  
Location 
Modification 
Direction 
Result 
Value Equivalent Strategy Equivalent 
Multiple rows and columns 
of equilibrium 
Either Yes No 
Single Row of Equilibrium Increase Yes No Decrease No No 
Single Column of  
Equilibrium 
Increase No No 
Decrease Yes No 
 
B.1.2 Stability of Cells in Row of Equilibrium Cells 
By the first property of PSNEs within a constant sum game as presented in Ap-
pendix A where the row player is the maximizer, the row player’s payoff value for a cell 
that shares a row with an equilibrium cell must be strictly greater than the value of the 
equilibrium cell(s) of the game.  If the cell has a value equal to the equilibrium cell, it 
would be part of the equilibrium.  As the value(s) of these cells in the row of the equilib-
rium cell(s) have no effect on the value of the game, the only constraint on the payoff 
value of these cells is that they fulfill this strict inequality requirement.  In order for a cell 
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with value r in the row of an equilibrium cell to change the strategy profile and value v of 
the game, it must violate the constraint shown in Equation 60. 
 𝑟 > 𝑣 (60) 
Therefore, any game whose payoff for the row player for these cells fulfills this 
constraint without any other changes to other cells is value-equivalent and strate-
gy-equivalent to the original game.  Violation of this constraint causes the modified game 
to be neither value-equivalent nor strategy-equivalent to the original game (unless the 
resulting new Nash equilibrium happens to be value-equivalent with the original game). 
B.1.3 Stability of Cells in Column of Equilibrium Cells 
The second property of PSNEs within a constant sum game (presented in Appen-
dix A) bounds the values of cells within the column of an equilibrium cell.  These cells 
must be strictly less than the value of the equilibrium cell or the strategy profile of the 
game is changed (either by changing the equilibrium location or adding another PSNE 
cell).  This constraint is shown in Equation 61, where c is the value of a cell in the col-
umn of an equilibrium cell and v is the value of the game. 
 
𝑐 < 𝑣 (61) 
Changing the value of same-column cells has no effect on the value of the game 
as long as the original equilibrium is maintained.  Therefore, any game with these cells 
fulfilling the constraint shown in Equation 61 and no other changes to the payoff matrix 
that violate payoff value constraints is both value-equivalent and strategy-equivalent to 
the original game.  Violation of this constraint leads to a change in equilibrium and there-
fore the altered game cannot be strategy-equivalent to the original game (and it will not 
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be value-equivalent unless the resulting new equilibrium has the same value as the origi-
nal game).   
B.1.4 Stability of Cells in neither Row nor Column of Equilibrium Cells 
Changing payoffs can only modify the value or strategy profile of the game by 
eliminating the existing PSNE or by creating a new one.  As the existing PSNE has no 
dependency upon the values of the cells outside the row and column of the PSNE, modi-
fications of these values will have no effect upon the existence of the current PSNE of the 
game.  The properties of PSNEs described in Appendix A state that it is impossible for 
two unique PSNEs to exist in the game, so modifying these cells cannot create a second 
unique-value PSNE in the game.  Also, any cell at the intersection of the row of one equi-
librium cell and the column of the other must also be a non-unique PSNE.  Using this 
information, we can conclude that it is impossible to create a non-unique PSNE at this 
location without modification to create the other necessary equilibrium cells.  Therefore, 
modification of the payoff values of these cells without changing other cells to violate the 
constraints described in Equations 60 and 61 create a game which is value-equivalent and 
strategy-equivalent to the original game.  The only exception to this is if the cells in the 
intersection of the row/column of the cell being modified and the column/row of the equi-
librium cell have the same value as the equilibrium cell.  This case results in the equilib-
rium cell shifting to the modified cell but only applies if these equalities are true. 
Two two-player, constant-sum games are value and strategy-equivalent as long as 
they both contain PSNEs with the same value in the same locations (after necessary iso-
morphic transformations), all values in the row of a PSNE cell are strictly greater than the 
value of the game, and all the rows in the column of an equilibrium cell are strictly less 
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than the value of the game.  The scenarios in which the original game and the modified 
game are value-equivalent or strategy-equivalent have also been described.  Next, the 
stability of the equilibrium is determined by finding the maximum value by which any 
cell of the payoff matrix can be changed without causing a change in the value or strategy 
profile of the game.  This is accomplished by calculating the sensitivity of the equilibri-
um: the minimum modification to one or more payoff values that causes either the 
game’s value or strategy profile to change. 
The sensitivity of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a two-player, constant-sum 
game can be determined by the minimum amount of change to the payoff value of a cell 
necessary to create a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) within the game  or relo-
cate the PSNE.  
A MSNE can be created by modification of the payoff values in the matrix such 
that no payoff location fulfills the requirements for a PSNE, (minimum in its row and 
maximum in its column from the row player’s perspective).  Once a MSNE is created in 
the game, the strategy profile of the game is different from that of the original game.   
Modifying a non-equilibrium payoff value to be equal to the Nash equilibrium 
value can create an equilibrium where one player is indifferent between two strategies 
because they both yield the same payoff.  Changing a value in the row (or column) of the 
Nash equilibrium cell to be strictly less than (or greater than) the equilibrium cell can 
eliminate the original PSNE.  The sensitivity of the game’s equilibrium (reported as a 
payoff difference) can be quantified as the minimum amount of payoff change necessary 
to add a PSNE or eliminate an existing one, as shown in Equation 62, where r is the value 
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of a cell in the row of the PSNE cell, and c is the value of a cell in the column of the 
PSNE cell. 
 𝑠 = min((∀𝑟, min(𝑟 − 𝑣)) , (∀𝑐, min(𝑣 − 𝑐)))       (62) 
 
As the equilibrium’s sensitivity provides a minimum change necessary to cause a 
game to change equilibrium classes, a game’s stability is bounded above by this value.  
The stability bounds for games with PSNEs are shown in Table 4, where m is the change 
in value to the payoff value of the indicated cell.  The bounds constrain the value of m to 
ranges that do not break the value or strategy stability of the game.  In Table 4, the values 
for 𝑟′ and 𝑐′ are defined in Equations 63 and 64, where r is a cell in the row of the equi-
librium and c is the value of a cell in the column of the equilibrium. 
 𝑟′ =  min (𝑟) (63) 
 𝑐′ =  max (𝑐) (64) 
Table 4. Stability Bounds for Games Containing PSNEs. 
Modification Location Value Stability Strategy Stability 
Equilibrium Location 𝑚 ≠ min �r′ − v,v − c′� 𝑚 < min �r′ − v,v − c′� 
Row of Equilibrium 
(single row of PSNEs) 
𝑚 < 𝑟′ − 𝑣 𝑚 < 𝑟′ − 𝑣 
Row of Equilibrium 
(multiple rows of PSNEs) 
𝑚 unbounded 𝑚 < 𝑟′ − 𝑣 
Column of Equilibrium 
(single column of PSNEs) 
𝑚 > 𝑐′ − 𝑣 𝑚 > 𝑐′ − 𝑣 
Column of Equilibrium 
(multiple rows of PSNEs) 
𝑚 unbounded 𝑚 > 𝑐′ − 𝑣 
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Using the stability bounds described in Table 4, it is now possible to calculate the 
stability of a game containing a PSNE.  As stated earlier, the stability of a game is de-
fined as the minimum amount by which a cell in the game can be modified to produce a 
game that is not strategy-equivalent to the original game.   
Strategy-equivalence is the important aspect of equilibrium stability for our re-
search because in the environmental deception paradigm, both players receive the payoff 
values produced by their choices of strategy based upon the payoff matrix of the original 
game.  As the deception does not affect reality, modifying the payoff matrix in a way that 
preserves the original strategy profile of the game has no benefit to the deceiver.  Envi-
ronmental deception can only affect the value of the game by causing the mark to use a 
different strategy profile than he would choose if he knew the true payoff matrix of the 
game.  Therefore, strategy stability is the important aspect of equilibrium stability for this 
research. 
Table 4 provides the stability values for each of the three regions of the payoff 
matrix where modifications to the payoff matrix have an effect upon the equilibrium sta-
bility of the game.  The stability of a game with a PSNE is described in Equation 65, 
where 𝑠𝑒, 𝑠𝑟, and 𝑠𝑐 are the upper bounds on the cell stability as described in Table 4 of 
the equilibrium location, row of equilibrium, and column of equilibrium respectively. 
 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  min (𝑠𝑒 , 𝑠𝑟, 𝑠𝑐) (65) 
 
This value of stability is useful as it defines the lower bound on the amount of 
cost necessary to perform environmental deception in a game containing a PSNE.  If the 
maximum allowable cost of deception does not exceed this value, then it is impossible to 
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modify the strategy profile of the mark in the game and all cost incurred in deception is 
wasted.  The next section expands the definition of stability presented here to cover 
games containing MSNEs.  
B.2 Stability of Games Containing Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria 
Now that we have presented a means for determining the equilibrium stability and 
payoff generalizations of a game containing pure strategy Nash equilibria, we shift our 
focus to games with mixed strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE).  We begin by defining 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibria and use this definition to compute the relative payoff val-
ues of the various strategy profiles within the game.  Using this information, we can de-
rive the payout generalizations and equilibrium stability for various forms of mixed strat-
egy Nash equilibria. 
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists when for all players in a game, a play-
er’s mixed strategy maximizes his payoff given that the opponent’s strategies are fixed 
[2].  In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, each player selects the probability of playing 
each of their strategies to make their opponent indifferent between each of the strategies 
in their strategy set, i.e. the expected payoff value of all of their strategies in their strategy 
set are equal.  Also, this expected value is strictly greater than the expected value gained 
by selecting a strategy outside of this strategy set. 
The existence of a MSNE implies that those strategies outside of the MSNE have 
a strictly lower expected value than those within the MSNE and have no effect on the 
value of the game. Therefore, two games with the same payoff values of the cells within 
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and for which all strategies outside the strategy set 
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of the MSNE for a given player are less desirable to that player than those within the 
MSNE strategy set for that player are both value-equivalent and strategy-equivalent. 
a b c 
d e f 
g h i 
Figure 18. Example 3x3 Game. 
As an example, we use the 3x3 zero sum game shown in Figure 18, where values 
with a subscript of one are the payoff to the row player and values with a subscript of two 
are payoffs for the column player.  Assume that a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists 
in this game in which the row player will play the top row with probability p and the 
middle row with probability 1-p.  Similarly, the column player will play the leftmost and 
middle columns with probabilities q and 1-q respectively.  By the definition of mixed 
strategy Nash equilibria, the value v of the game for the row player is presented in Equa-
tion 66, where each variable other than q is the payoff value of the given cell from the 
perspective of the row player. 
 
𝑣 = 𝑞 ∙ 𝑎1 + (1 − 𝑞) ∙ 𝑏1 = 𝑞 ∙ 𝑑1 + (1 − 𝑞) ∙ 𝑒1 (66) 
The same value of the game can be calculated by equating the strategies of the 
column player while using the row player’s payoffs for each cell as shown in Equation 
67.  This is possible because the payoffs and value of the game of the column player are 
one minus that of the row player.  For the remainder of this Appendix, the subscript will 
be removed and the value used is the payoff from the perspective of the row player. 
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 𝑣2 = 𝑝 ∙ 𝑎2 + (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑑2 = 𝑝 ∙ 𝑏2 + (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑒2 
𝑣2 = 𝑝 ∙ (1 − 𝑎1) + (1 − 𝑝) ∙ (1 − 𝑑1) = 𝑝 ∙ (1 − 𝑏1) + (1 − 𝑝) ∙ (1 − 𝑒1) 
𝑣2 = 𝑝 − 𝑎1𝑝 + 1 − 𝑑1 − 𝑝 + 𝑑1𝑝 = 𝑝 − 𝑏1𝑝 + 1 − 𝑒1 − 𝑝 + 𝑒1𝑝 
𝑣2 = 1 − (𝑎1𝑝 + 𝑑1 − 𝑑1𝑝) = 1 − (𝑏1𝑝 + 𝑒1 − 𝑒1𝑝) 1 − 𝑣1 = 1 − (𝑎1𝑝 + 𝑑1 − 𝑑1𝑝) = 1 − (𝑏1𝑝 + 𝑒1 − 𝑒1𝑝) 
𝑣1 = 𝑝 ∙ 𝑎1 + (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑑1 = 𝑝 ∙ 𝑏1 + (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑒1 
(67) 
 
From the knowledge of the mixed strategy equilibrium in the game, we can also 
conclude that strategies outside of the equilibrium have values that are less desirable than 
the value of the game given the current probabilities of the opponent.  For the row player, 
this means the value should be less than the current value of the game from the row play-
er’s perspective.  For the column player, this means a value greater than the value v while 
using the row player’s payoff values.  These conditions are represented in Equations 68 
and 69. 
 𝑣 > 𝑞 ∙ 𝑔 + (1 − 𝑞) ∙ ℎ (68) 
 𝑣 < 𝑝 ∙ 𝑐 + (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑓 (69) 
As long as these conditions hold, the existing MSNE of the game will remain the 
same.  Therefore, the values of g, h, c, and f are bounded as shown in Equations 70-73. 
 
𝑔 <  𝑣 − (1 − 𝑞) ∙ ℎ
𝑞
 (70) 
 ℎ <  𝑣 − 𝑞 ∙ 𝑔1 − 𝑞  (71) 
 
𝑐 >  𝑣 − (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑓
𝑝
 (72) 
 𝑓 >  𝑣 − 𝑝 ∙ 𝑐1 − 𝑝  (73) 
These inequalities bound the payoff values of those cells that are contained within 
the strategy set of one player but not the other in a MSNE.  The final type of cell is that 
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which is contained in the strategy set of neither player.  For this cell to affect the equilib-
rium of the game, it is necessary for its value to be preferred to the current strategy set for 
both players, i.e. it must become a PSNE.  This cannot occur unless the values of other 
cells are modified in a way that already would eliminate the original Nash equilibrium.   
It can be proven based upon von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem that a MSNE and 
a PSNE cannot exist simultaneously within a game where the payoffs in each cell of the 
matrix sum to one (see Appendix A).  Modification of only the value of i has no effect 
upon the value or strategy profile of the game because it cannot become a PSNE without 
eliminating the existing MSNE.  As the existing MSNE constrains the values of same-
row and same-column members (such as c, f, g, and h), but not non-row or non-column 
payoffs such as i, modifications to the value of i cannot eliminate the MSNE. Therefore, 
the value of a cell that is not contained in any of the strategy sets of a MSNE has no ef-
fect on the equilibrium and games with identical MSNEs and no other constraint viola-
tions are equivalent with regard to value and strategy regardless of their value of cells 
that are not contained within any strategy of the Nash equilibrium. 
Now that we have determined the bounds for the various classes of variables in a 
game containing a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, we can determine the stability of the 
game: the maximum modification to a payoff from the game possible without changing 
the value or strategy profile of the game.  This value is found by calculating the equilibri-
um’s sensitivity, the minimum change necessary to change the value or strategy profile of 
the game.  The change in value or strategy profile of the game can be accomplished either 
by modifying the payoff values within the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game or by 
modifying those cells contained by one player’s strategy set but not the other’s. 
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MSNEs are sensitive to perturbations to the payoff values of the cells within the 
equilibrium.  Modification of the payoff values within the mixed strategy equilibrium by 
any amount has an effect on the value and/or probabilities of the equilibrium.  As the 
probabilities are selected to make the opponent indifferent between two or more strate-
gies that possibly have different total payoffs, a modification of these payoffs necessitates 
a different set of probabilities to achieve this goal.  If the payoff values of the cells within 
the MSNE are changed enough, it is possible that new strategies may be added or re-
moved from the equilibrium as their value to a player relative to the value of the equilib-
rium increases or decreases.  These changes equate to modifying the value of the equilib-
rium cell of a PSNE.  The stability bounds for this case are shown in the first row of Ta-
ble 5, where m is the amount of change made to the payoff value of the indicated cell.  
The stability bounds describe the values of m that do not break the game’s value stability 
or strategy stability. 
A MSNE can also be changed by modifying the payoff values contained in only 
one set without changing both sets of strategies.  These modifications are similar to the 
modifications of cells within the row and column of a PSNE discussed above and like 
those are quantifiable by the minimal modification to have an effect.  Like the cells in the 
row and column of a PSNE, the cells in one player’s strategy set are bounded by the max-
imum or minimum values they can contain without disrupting the equilibrium.  Therefore 
the stability of the equilibrium is bounded by the minimum perturbation to one of these 
cells that causes the cell to violate the constraints bounding it.  The stability bounds for 
cells in the rows and columns of the equilibrium are shown in the second and third rows 
of Table 5 respectively.  In Table 5, the values of 𝑟′ and 𝑐′ are defined in Equations 74 
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and 75, where v is the value of the game, r is the value of a cell in the row of the equilib-
rium, 𝑟′′ is the value of the other cell in the row of the equilibrium (assuming a 2x2 
MSNE), c is the value of a cell in the column of the equilibrium, 𝑐′′ is the other cell in the 
column of the equilibrium, and p and q are the probabilities that the strategies resulting in 
p or c are played. 
 
𝑟′ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 �𝑣 − (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑟′′
𝑝
� (74) 
 
𝑐′ = min�𝑣 − (1 − 𝑞) ∙ 𝑐′′
𝑞
� (75) 
Table 5. Stability Bounds for Games Containing MSNEs 
Modification Location Value Stability Strategy Stability 
Equilibrium Location 𝑚 = 0 𝑚 = 0 
Row of Equilibrium 𝑚 < 𝑟′ 𝑚 < 𝑟′ 
Column of Equilibrium 𝑚 > −𝑐′ 𝑚 > −𝑐′ 
 
The above analysis derives the stability bounds and sensitivity of cells in a 3x3 
game with a 2x2 MSNE.  This analysis can be expanded to different sizes of games with 
MSNEs of different sizes based upon the same principles and relationships between cells 
used for the 2x2 MSNE in the example game. 
99 
Bibliography 
 
[1]  A. Brandenburger, "Cooperative Game Theory: Characteristic Functions, 
Allocations, Marginal Contribution," Stern School of Business New York 
University, New York, 2007. 
[2]  J. Nash, "Noncooperative Games," The Annals of Mathematics Second Series, vol. 
54, no. 2, pp. 286-295, September 1951.  
[3]  H. Arsham, "Stability of Essential Strategy in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games," 
Congress Numerantium, vol. 110, pp. 167-180, 1995.  
[4]  T. E. Carroll and D. Grosu, "A Game Theoretic Investigation of Deception in 
Network Security," in Proceedings of 18th International Conference on 
Computer Communications and Networks, San Francisco, 2009.  
[5]  N. Garg and D. Grosu, "Deception in Honeynets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," in 
Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance, West Point, 
2007.  
[6]  R. Pibil, V. Lisy, C. Kiekintveld, B. Bosansky and M. Pechoucek, "Game Theoretic 
Model of Strategic Honeypot Allocation in Computer Networks," Decision and 
Game Theory for Security, vol. 1, pp. 201-220, 2012.  
[7]  J. Zhuang, V. M. Bier and O. Alagoz, "Modeling Secrecy and Deception in a 
Multiple-Period Attacker-Defender Signaling Game," European Journal of 
Operational Research, vol. 203, pp. 409-418, 2010.  
[8]  J. P. Hespanha, Y. S. Ateskan and H. H. Kizilocak, "Deception in Non-Cooperative 
Games with Partial Information," in Proceedings of the 2nd DARPA-JFACC 
Symposium on Advances in Enterprise Control, 2000.  
[9]  C. Y. Ma, D. K. Yau, X. Lou and N. S. Rao, "Markov Game Analysis for Attack-
Defense of Power Networks Under Possible Misinformation," IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 1676-1686, 2013.  
[10]  K. T. Lee and K. L. Teo, "A Game with Distorted Information," Naval Research 
100 
Logistics, vol. 40, pp. 993-1001, 1993.  
[11]  Y. Yavin, "Pursuit-Evasion Games with Deception or Interrupted Observation," 
Computers & Mathematics with Applications, vol. 13, no. 1-3, pp. 191-203, 
1987.  
[12]  G. Levitin and K. Hausken, "Is it wise to leave some false targets unprotected?," 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, vol. 112, pp. 176-186, 2013.  
[13]  Z. E. Fuchs and P. P. Khargonekar, "Games, Deception, and Jones' Lemma," in 2011 
American Control Conference, San Francisco, 2011.  
[14]  V. Lisy, R. Zivan and K. Sycara, "Deception in Networks of Mobile Sensing 
Agents," in Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous 
Agents and Multiagent Systems, Toronto, 2010.  
[15]  B. Gharesifard and J. Cortes, "Evolution of Players' Misperceptions Under Perfect 
Observations," IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 57, no. 7, pp. 
1627-1640, 2011.  
[16]  B. Gharesifard and J. Cortes, "Stealthy Deception in Hypergames Under 
Informational Asymmetry," in IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics, 2013.  
[17]  B. Gharesifard and J. Cortes, "Stealthy Strategies for Deception in Hypergames with 
Asymmetric Information," in 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 
and European Control Conference, Orlando, 2011.  
[18]  A. R. Wagner and R. C. Arkin, "Robot Deception: Recognizing when a robot should 
deceive," in 2009 IEEE International Symposium on Computational Intelligence 
in Robotics and Automation (CIRA), Daejeon, 2009.  
[19]  A. R. Wagner and R. C. Arkin, "Acting Deceptively: Providing Robots with the 
Capacity for Deception," International Journal of Social Robotics, vol. 3, no. 1, 
pp. 5-26, 2011.  
[20]  I. Greenberg, "The Role of Deception in Decision Theory," The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 139-156, 1982.  
101 
[21]  I. Greenberg, "The Effect of Deception on Optimal Decisions," Operations Research 
Letters, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 144-147, 1982.  
[22]  D. Li and J. B. Cruz Jr., "Information, decision-making, and deception in games," 
Decision Support Systems, vol. 47, pp. 518-527, 2009.  
[23]  E. Kohlberg and J.-F. Mertens, "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," 
Econometrica, vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 1003-1037, September 1986.  
[24]  F. Germano, "On Nash Equivalence Classes of Generic Normal Form Games," 
Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and 
Econometrics (CORE) Discussion Papers, vol. 1998033, pp. 1-31, May 1998.  
[25]  F. Germano, "On Some Geometry and Equivalence Classes of Normal Form 
Games," International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 561-581, 
November 2006.  
[26]  B. D. Bernheim, "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, vol. 52, no. 4, 
pp. 1007-1028, July 1984.  
[27]  M. Dufwenberg and M. Stegeman, "Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal 
Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance," Econometrica, vol. 70, no. 5, pp. 
2007-2023, September 2002.  
[28]  R. J. Aumann, "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," 
Econometrica, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 1-18, January 1987.  
[29]  S. Morris and T. Ui, "Best Response Equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, 
vol. 49, pp. 260-287, April 2004.  
[30]  J. von Neumann, "Zur Therorie der Gesellschaftsspiele," Mathemaitsche Annalen, 
vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 295-320, 1928.  
 
  
102 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, search-
ing existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding 
this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington 
Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-
4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a 
collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
18-06-2015 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis  
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
August 2013 – June 2015 
TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
Generation of Strategies for Environmental Deception 
in Two-Player Normal-Form Games 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Poston III, Howard E., Civilian, USAF 
 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
15G225 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
  Air Force Institute of Technology 
 Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 
 2950 Hobson Way, Building 640 
 WPAFB OH 45433-8865 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
     AFIT-ENG-MS-15-J-004 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Intentionally Left Blank 
 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
ACRONYM(S) 
 
N/A 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S)   N/A 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
     DISTRUBTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES   
This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 
United States. 
14. ABSTRACT  
 
Methods of performing and defending against deceptive actions are a popular field of study in game theory; howev-
er, the focus is mostly on action deception in turn-based games.  This work focuses on developing strategies for 
performing environmental deception in two-player, strategic-form games.  Environmental deception is defined as 
deception where one player has the ability to change the other’s perception of the state of the game through modifi-
cation of their perception of the game’s payoff matrix, similar to the use of camouflage.  The main contributions of 
this research are an expansion of the definition of the stability of a Nash equilibrium to include cells outside the 
equilibrium, and the creation of four algorithms for developing strategies for environmental deception, including 
closed-form solutions for the creation of a 3x3 deceptive game with a 2x2 mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) 
that benefits the deceiver from a 3x3 game containing a 2x2 MSNE.  It is found that the value gain produced by a 
deceptive algorithm is dependent upon the type of game to which it is applied and the maximum amount of allowa-
ble change to the payoff matrix emphasizing the importance of carefully selecting an algorithm to match the situa-
tion to which it is applied.   
 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
      Game theory, environmental deception, equilibrium stability 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF: 
17. LIMITATION 
OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
UU 
18. 
NUMBER  
OF PAGES 
 
112 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Dr. Brett Borghetti AFIT/ENG 
a. 
REPORT 
 
U 
b. 
ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. THIS 
PAGE 
 
U 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-6565, ext 4612 
brett.borghetti@afit.edu 
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
